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While the United States has some of the highest healthcare spending in the world, it has
some of the worst health outcomes. For example, maternal mortality in the United States is
almost five times as high as in other similarly wealthy countries. It also has the highest rates of
avoidable deaths. One of the reasons for this may be the cost of accessing healthcare due to
privatized insurance. For example, Americans may avoid important preventive medical visits and
other health screeners due to cost. While lack of health insurance has been correlated with
decreased health utilization, a precise understanding of the determinants of care seeking has not
been established. Modeling healthcare use based on common symptoms (e.g., cough, headache,
nausea) can provide insight on how Americans may seek care for symptoms that could be
indicative of more serious health problems. Modeling of decision-making can be accomplished
through methods used in behavioral economics, most notably methods for studying intertemporal
choice. Therefore, the purpose of present study was to apply behavioral economic methodologies
to better understand healthcare utilization based on symptom, severity, and cost. Three
experimental surveys each consisting of 200 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk were conducted. The first experimental survey consisted of monetary discounting of
delayed or probabilistic rewards and losses as well as medical decision-making for seeking a
medical professional based on symptom (i.e., cough, headache, nausea) and severity (i.e., mild,
moderate, severe). With regard to monetary discounting, data replicated typical monetary
discounting research. The gain/loss changes in discounting occurred for delayed and probabilistic

outcomes. With regard to health decision-making, as severity of symptom and duration of
symptom experienced increased, so did likelihood to seek a healthcare professional. When cost
was added as a factor in Experiments 2 and 3, increased costs decreased likelihood to seek a
healthcare professional. Generally, models used in monetary discounting fit participant data well.
When possible to assess the relationship between impulsivity, riskiness, and health decisionmaking, there was a positive relationship between seeking medical help and impulsivity. That is,
those that were “more impulsive” based on monetary discounting were more likely to seek a
healthcare professional for symptoms sooner. There was no relationship between impulsivity and
riskiness as determined by monetary discounting, nor was riskiness related to health decisionmaking. For demographic variables, better health decreased the likelihood of seeing health
professional, as well as for those who reported previously avoiding or delaying going to a doctor
due to cost. The implications of these results are straightforward, in that associating a cost with
healthcare will decrease the likelihood an individual will seek medical treatment at all levels of
symptom severity. This study adds to growing body of data that the American medical system is
in need of substantial reform if the goal is to keep all Americans healthy, rather than only those
Americans who can afford it.
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It’s the Prices, Stupid
The United States healthcare system is a paradox. Though the United States spends twice
as much of its GDP on healthcare compared to other countries, it has the lowest average life
expectancy, and some of the lowest birth weights (Papanicolas et al., 2018). For those who can
access it, the United States has good preventive care compared to economically similar countries,
but it also has the highest rates of avoidable deaths (Tikkanen & Abrams, 2020). When
compared to Canada, a relatively similar country with socialized rather than privatized health
insurance, the impact of socioeconomic status (SES) on health was higher in the US than in
Canada (Wilson, 2009). And while cancer deaths are on the decline in United States (CDC,
2020a), disparities exist in the form of increased cancer deaths for those who are either low SES
or non-white (Ward et al., 2004). Similarly, the maternal death rate for African-American
women is four times higher than that of white women, and the infant mortality rate is nearly
three times as high (Taylor, 2019). In fact, the United States has an abnormally high maternal
death rate when compared to similar countries (Sawyer & McDermott, 2019).
Part of the differences between health outcomes, especially for preventable deaths may
have a simple explanation which is stated succinctly in the titles of papers by Anderson et al.
(2003), “It’s the prices, stupid” and Anderson et al. (2019) “It’s still the prices, stupid”. The
average cost of healthcare spent per person in the United States is twice that of comparable
countries (Sawyer & McDermott, 2020). Most importantly, medical debt the is most common
form of personal debt in the United States (Doty et al., 2008; Himmelstein et al, 2009;
Himmelstein et al., 2019). This high cost of healthcare, and potential fear of medical debt, may
deter Americans from utilizing preventive medical services that will decrease larger, worse
outcomes later. Using cancer as an example, Etzioni et al. (2003) argue that early detection is an
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important factor for cancer outcomes, but for cancer to be detected, and therefore treated, early,
an individual first must get the appropriate health screener. However, if people are unable to
afford or are deterred by cost of a screener, early detection is not possible. Ward et al. (2004)
found that preventive screens were at times less than half as likely to occur for those without
health insurance, and also found that stage of cancer (i.e., how much the cancer has spread), was
higher for those in areas with higher poverty rates. Less advanced cancers would also be easier to
treat, and therefore less costly to treat. If people cannot access healthcare, they cannot have a
potentially deleterious health condition identified or treated.
Generally, healthcare utilization is negatively correlated with distance to clinics (Buzza et
al., 2011; Virgilsen et al., 2019), cost of service (Kullgren et al., 2010), ethnic group (Bradley et
al., 2001), socio-economic status (Kullgren et al., 2010), and being male (Boman & Walker,
2010). However, how any given individual will access healthcare is not clear. Currently, no
quantitative analysis exists on how individuals might seek healthcare for commonly occurring
symptoms, such as those that might occur during a flu or cold (e.g., cough, headache, nausea).
For example, while a mild headache that lasts a day may not be indicative of an underlying
condition, a headache that persists for weeks could be a symptom of cancer (American Cancer
Society; ACS, 2020) or a variety of other causes (Mayo Clinic, 2020). Therefore, quantifying
exactly how an individual decides to seek healthcare for common symptoms, with different costs
to access healthcare, could greatly enhance understanding of when and how someone will make
medical- and health-related decisions.
Behavioral Economics
One of the possible ways to assess health-related decision-making is through methods
developed in the behavioral economic tradition. Contrasted to classical economics (i.e., rational
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choice), behavioral economics assumes that many factors will affect decision-making (i.e.,
irrational choice; Angner, 2016). What it means to behave rationality as per classical economics
is simply if an individual follows a normative model (i.e., how classical economists believe
people ought to behave). Behavioral economics instead uses descriptive models (i.e., how people
actually behave). One of the most popular examples of this so-called irrational decision-making
is the Asian disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In the Asian disease problem,
participants are presented with a choice between two possible treatments for a disease that will
kill 600 people. The first two treatments are (a) 200 people will be saved or (b) there is a 1/3
probability that 600 people will be saved, and a 2/3 probability that no one will be saved. When
presented this way, the majority of people pick option (a). However, when the treatments are
presented as (c) 400 people will die or (d) there is a 1/3 probability that no one will die, and a 2/3
probability that 600 people will die, the majority of people will pick option (d). This is odd, as
mathematically (a) and (c) are equivalent, as well as (b) and (d). A rational actor would be
expected to make the same choice between both forms of questions, but people weigh outcomes
differently based on the way they are presented.
Another example of irrational choice according to classical economics is seen in
intertemporal choice, where one decides between two or more outcomes occurring at different
times (see Frederick et al., 2002 for a comprehensive review). Samuelson (1937) provided a
conceptual framework of utility (i.e., value) of a commodity being discounted in an exponential
fashion. Basically, the more delayed an outcome is, the less value it has. That is, the value of an
outcome is discounted as a function of time. Therefore, Samuelson proposed an initial model of
delay-discounting with an exponential decay. This form of discounting from classical economics
contains the assumption that general preferences between outcomes will remain stable as time
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changes. That is, if one were to value $1,000 higher than $100 dollars, they would always value
$1,000 as higher than $100, even though the subjective value of both has changed as a result of a
delay. Instead, individuals will switch their preference (i.e., select the lesser valued option
instead of the higher valued option) between outcomes as the time to the less valued reward
decreases (e.g., Green et al., 1994). For example, an individual who decides to not buy chocolate
before going grocery shopping but buys chocolate once at the grocery store. Another example
would be someone deciding to go to the gym and exercise but on the way to the gym instead
buys a bag of chips and avoids the gym. This time-inconsistent preference-switching is known as
preference reversals.
Hyperbolic Discounting
Rather than discounting outcomes exponentially, humans instead discount values of
delayed outcomes in a hyperbolic fashion (Rachlin et al., 1991; Vandervelt et al., 2016) in
contrast to the original Samuelson (1937) formulation of discounted utility with exponential
decay. Rather than an outcome being discounted constantly over time, its value instead sharply
drops and then levels off. This is known as hyperbolic discounting (e.g., Madden & Johnson,
2010; Odum, 2011) and appears to account for preference reversals. An excellent example of
preference reversal relevant to medical-decision making is found in Christensen-Szalinski
(1984). In this study, pregnant women were asked how important it was to deliver their child
without anesthesia, and how concerned they were about avoiding hard labor pains. Before labor,
women generally preferred avoiding anesthesia. However, during labor, they overwhelmingly
changed their preference to avoiding pain. After childbirth the mothers’ preferences returned to
avoiding anesthesia. As the time1 to the outcome changed, in this case labor, preferences
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As well as other environmental factors like pain.
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changed. More importantly, the exact time a preference reversal would occur can be identified
through what are known as indifference points (explained below). Use of these indifference
points and hyperbolic modelling also allow for predicting when an individual might engage in
some health behavior. For example, Jarmolowicz et al. (2016) determined the specific point
when individuals with multiple sclerosis would be likely to take a disease modifying treatment
based on the treatment’s effectiveness and side effect severity. The strength of this approach
allows for not only understanding how decision-making for health outcomes is affected by
various factors, but it can also be used to predict the amount of that factor is needed for
individuals to make a decision. Therefore, these models have the potential to be extended to
predict and understand other medical and preventive behaviors, such as treatment seeking for
specific symptoms experienced for varying durations.
The original method to determine indifference points for humans (i.e., the point at which
a preference switches between two outcomes) was developed by Rachlin et al. (1991). For this
method, a participant is asked to decide between two, typically monetary, options. One option is
for an immediate amount, whereas the other is the same amount but delivered later. An
individual’s subjective value between these two options is then derived by asking a series of
questions where the value of immediate amount is systematically decreased while the delay
remains fixed. When the individual switches preference from the larger, delayed reward to the
smaller, immediate reward this is referred to as an indifference point. The indifference point can
be interpreted as the subjective value of the larger later commodity at a given time point. For
example, if a participant reverses preference from the immediate reward of $500 to a reward of
$1,000 at a delay of one month, the subjective value of $1,000 at one month is equal to $500, or
half of its original value. This procedure is then continued with various delays tested, and
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indifference points are obtained for each delay. Indifference points are then used to calculate a
discount rate, which is also considered an index of an individual’s impulsivity. This is because it
is assumed that someone who chooses the smaller, sooner outcome is unable to wait to access the
larger, and presumably better, delayed outcome. Higher discount rates result in steeper curves,
and lower discount rates result in shallower curves. Because of this, high discount values and
steeper curves will be used interchangeably to describe those that are considered more
impulsive.2
Calculating Discounting
Prior to discussion of factors that affect discounting, and discounting specific to healthrelated decision-making, it is important to overview how discounting or discount rates are
typically determined. To calculate discount rates, there are at least 26 different models that have
been used or proposed (see Doyle, 2013). Due to their popularity, only four models will be
described in detail: Exponential, hyperbolic, Green and Myerson hyperboloid, and Rachlin
hyperboloid. Also, ways to calculate discounting will be presented as those with a priori
assumptions of discounting (i.e., theoretical) and those without (i.e., atheoretical). Separation of
these two categories is important, as theoretical assumptions that well describe monetary
discounting may not be appropriate to use for health-related discounting (see Van der Pol &
Cairns, 2011). There are many procedures used to assess discounting in humans, but all of them
use derived indifference points from which the following calculations can be applied.
Theoretical Discounting Rate Calculations
Samuelson (1937) initially proposed an exponential model for decaying subjective value
over time. This model follows the form V = Ae-kD , henceforth referred to as the exponential
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However, the exact nature of the impulsivity being measured via discounting has been debated (see Green &
Myerson, 2013).
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model, where V is the subjective value of a commodity, A is the undiscounted amount of that
value, k is the discount rate, and D is the delay to the commodity.
Mazur (1987) proposed an alternative model to discounting future outcomes in the form
of a hyperbolic function following the form V = A/(1 + kD), henceforth referred to as the
hyperbolic model, where k represents the discounting rate. For this formula and those that
follow, V and A represent the same variables as in the exponential model. This model has the
advantage of being empirically derived, whereas the exponential model is conceptually derived.
While the original hyperbolic model focuses on delay to an outcome or a reward, it can be
generalized to other situations, such as the probability of an outcome or the social distance of
someone receiving an outcome. For example, Rachlin et al. (1991) used the variation of V = A/(1
+ hΘ), for comparing discounting of probabilistic outcomes, where Θ is the odds against an
outcome and h is the discount rate. The calculation for odds against is Θ = (1 - p)/p, where p is
the probability of an event. In the case of probability discounting, lower h values are thought to
indicate an individual’s riskiness. This is because lower h values indicate more choices towards
the probabilistic outcome rather than the certain outcome. Social discounting using the
hyperbolic model is much the same as the previous delay and probability formulas (Jones &
Rachlin, 2006), V = A/(1 + sN), where N is the social distance from someone (e.g., child, sibling,
cousin, friend, stranger) and s is the discount rate. In the case of social discounting, an individual
can choose between smaller option for themselves, or a larger option for the other person. For
social discounting, higher s values are thought to be indicative of selfishness. This is because
higher s values require individuals to have chosen some smaller amount of money for themselves
over a larger amount for others.
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Myerson and Green (1995) proposed an adjustment to the hyperbolic model, where the
scaling parameter s is added to the denominator, V = A/(1 + kD)s. This equation will henceforth
be referred to as the GM hyperboloid model. When s is 1, this equation is identical to the
hyperbolic model. The scaling parameter s is meant to represent the typically nonlinear scaling
of time or odds against (Green & Myerson, 2004). Rachlin (2006) also proposed an alteration to
the hyperbolic model, where a psychophysical scaling parameter s is added to delay, V = A/(1 +
kDs). This model will be referred to as the Rachlin hyperboloid.
Yoon and Higgins (2008) proposed a relatively simple conversion from the k value
estimated from the hyperbolic model to be able to identify at what delay an individual is
indifferent between outcomes across delays, the effective delay 50 (ED50). The calculation for
this is simply ED50 = 1/k. Practically speaking, the ED50 is an easy way to convert and interpret
k values, as k on its own is relatively uninformative without context. In the case of ED50, the
specific point (e.g., day, probability, social distance) where an individual becomes more likely to
pick the smaller sooner option over the larger later option. For other outcomes, like EP50
(Jarmolowicz et al., 2016), the point found by inverting the discounting parameter indicates
when an individual might engage in a particular behavior based on the independent variables.
The hyperbolic and both hyperboloid models outperform the exponential model for
fitting indifference points, with both hyperboloid models generally outperforming the hyperbolic
model (Franck et al., 2015; Gilroy et al., 2017; McKerchar et al., 2009). Between the
hyperboloid models, the GM and Rachlin versions appear to provide similar fits to the data, with
the Rachlin hyperboloid slightly outperforming the GM hyperboloid. While these various
discounting models have been successful in describing discounting in humans, all require
theoretical assumptions. Not all humans will discount systematically (see Johnson & Bickel,
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2008; Smith et al., 2018), which can result in poor fits for all models. Because of this,
atheoretical approaches to calculating discounting have been proposed.
Atheoretical Discounting Rate Calculations
Myerson et al. (2001) described a procedure to calculate an overall measure of
discounting called area under the curve (AUC). After normalizing the delay, probability, or
social distance, and whatever value A was set to range from 0 to 1, AUC is calculated by adding
all the polygons for each interval to create a value from 0 to 1. The formula for this is AUC =
∑i=1(x2 - x1)[(y1 + y2)/2], where x1 is the smaller value of the normalized interval, x2 is the larger
value of the normalized interval, and y1 and y2 are the normalized indifference points at x1 and x2
respectively. All polygon areas are then summed together to generate a single AUC value for an
individual. Higher AUC values indicate shallower discounting, whereas lower AUC values
indicate steeper discounting. An AUC of 1 means that only the larger delayed outcome was
selected across all delays, while an AUC of 0 indicates only the smaller sooner outcome was
selected across all delays. While this approach has benefits, it has two major issues. It cannot be
used to predict the subjective value at a time point not tested, and it is insensitive to the direction
of discounting. For example, someone who displayed perfect linear discounting (i.e., a diagonal
line) who chose 100% the larger option at no delay, 50% of the larger option at the middle delay
and chose the larger option 0% at the last tested delay would have an AUC value of 0.5. By
contrast, someone who had consistent indifference across time points (e.g., 50% at all delays)
would also have an AUC of 0.5. If someone had a perfect linear increasing discount curve (i.e.,
0% larger option at no delay, 50% larger option at the middle delay, and 100% larger option at
last tested delay) would also have an AUC of 0.5. Because of this, for AUC to be a fair
assessment of discounting, it is necessary to consider the way an individual has answered
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discounting questions. AUC calculated in this way also does not take into considerations of delay
or probability scaling like the theoretical models.
To improve upon the AUC calculations introduced by Myerson et al. (2001), Borges et
al. (2016) proposed two alternative methods to implement prior to normalizing the data. The first
is by log scaling the delay before normalizing the data, then calculating AUC as described above.
This results in AUClog. For cases where the lowest delay is 0, a small constant can be added to
prevent issues with log transforming 0 (i.e., log transforming 0 results in negative infinity). The
second way is by rank ordering the delays, thereby resulting in equal weighting for all intervals,
and calculating AUC as described above. This then becomes AUCord. Borges et al. found that
AUClog and AUCord were both able to detect the magnitude effect in previous datasets where
AUC could not, providing an empirical basis for the superiority of AUClog and AUCord over
AUC.
Factors that Affect Discount Rates
Once discount rates are calculated for individuals, regardless of method of calculation,
comparisons can be made on how people discount specific commodities using the derived
discount rates. There are several ways that hypothetical situations are presented that will
consistently affect discounting. Some effects relevant to health-discounting will be briefly
discussed.
Magnitude of the Outcome
A robust effect that has been found is that the size of the outcome will affect how
individuals discount. For example, while the proportional difference between $5 and $10 is the
same as $500 and $1,000, people will have significantly different discount rates between the two
commodities. When discounting a delayed commodity, people will discount smaller values more
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than larger values (e.g., Baker et al., 2003; Blackburn & El-Deredy, 2013; Chapman, 1996;
Weatherly & Terrell, 2014). They act more impulsively towards smaller values than larger
values. However, the opposite effect is found for discounting a probabilistic outcome (e.g., Du et
al., 2002; Myerson et al., 2011; Weatherly & Terrell, 2014; Yi et al., 2006) where larger values
are discounted more than smaller values. In the case of probability discounting, increased
magnitude decreases riskiness.
Sign of the Outcome
Another robust effect that has been found to impact discount rates is whether an
individual is choosing between gains or losses. For example, people will discount gains of $50
now or $100 later more than they will discount losses of $50 now or $100 later (e.g., Baker et al.,
2003; Furrebøe, 2020; MerKerchar et al., 2013; Rzeszutek et al., under review). More
specifically, people will choose a delayed loss more often than a delayed gain when the absolute
difference between the alternatives are the same.
Magnitude and Sign of the Outcome
Interestingly, the magnitude is moderated by the sign of the commodity. The magnitude
effect does not appear to occur for losses of delayed or probabilistic outcomes (Green et al, 2014;
MerKerchar et al., 2013). That is, the discounting of losses is not affected by how small or how
large, the loss is. Losses appear to be discounted consistently.
Type of Outcome
The last factor that will be discussed that affects discounting is the nature of the
commodity of the outcome being discounted. Odum et al. (2020) conducted a systematic review
of studies that measured delay discounting of monetary outcomes and at least one non-monetary
outcome. The overall finding by Odum et al. was that non-monetary outcomes are more steeply
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discounted than monetary outcomes. In some cases, discounting rates between monetary and
other outcomes (e.g., food, cigarettes, drugs) were correlated, but this correlation between health
discounting and monetary discounting was inconsistent.
Discounting and Health-Related Behaviors
There are several major areas where steeper delay discounting (i.e., higher impulsivity) of
monetary rewards has been correlated with unhealthy behaviors (e.g., smoking, excessive eating,
risky sexual behavior). In a systematic review by Story et al. (2014), the authors found that
higher monetary discount rates would predict smoking, alcohol use, other drug use, and an
emerging relationship with obesity. Story et al. also found that there was mixed but emerging
evidence of lower rates of discounting being associated with preventive health behaviors (e.g.,
mammograms, prostate exams, flu shot, dental visits). In two meta-analyses by MacKillop et al.
(2011) and Amlung, Vedelago, et al. (2016) an association between addictive behaviors (i.e.,
alcohol, tobacco, gambling, cannabis, and stimulant use) and delay discounting was found.
A meta-analysis of the discounting of food and monetary rewards by Amlung, Petker, et al.
(2016) found that those who were considered obese discounted more steeply than those who
were not. Monetary discounting is also related to psychiatric diagnosis. Amlung et al. (2019)
conducted a meta-analysis of monetary discounting and various mental health diagnoses. They
found that for major depressive disorder, schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder, bipolar
disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, bulimia nervosa, and binge eating those with a
diagnosis were more likely to discount delayed monetary rewards. Only in the case of anorexia
nervosa was there a decrease in discounting. This makes intuitive sense, as anorexia nervosa is
the virtual opposite of binge eating.
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Because of the generally robust relationship between steep discounting and unhealthy
behaviors, this has lead conceptualizing excessive discounting as part of a trans-disease process
(e.g., Bickel et al., 2019; Bickel et al., 2012; Bickel & Mueller, 2009). The idea of a trans-disease
process is relatively straight forward. Excessive discounting of reinforcers (e.g., food, money,
drugs) is in part due a common underlying mechanism. Bickel et al. (2012) argue that this
excessive may be due in part to competing neurobehavioral systems, where parts of the brain
activated for choices for immediate reward (e.g., limbic system) are in competition with the parts
of the brain that are activated during choices of delayed reward (e.g., prefrontal cortex).
Excessive discounting of reinforcers occurs when the limbic system is more activated during
valuations of reward than the prefrontal cortex (Bickel et al., 2011). This may be part of the
reason why there excessive discounting is so correlated with unhealthy behaviors that are
typically defined by excess (e.g., overeating, drug use, risky sex). The review by Amlung et al.
(2019) on discounting and psychiatric disorders provides some diagnostic evidence of this idea,
as many psychiatric issues share a trans-diagnostic process involving cognitive control
(McTeague et al., 2016). However, whether this trans-disease model of excessive discounting
applies specifically to medical discounting and decision-making is not yet clear.
Health and Medical Discounting
The following section is divided into two categories, studies that directly compare health
outcomes with monetary discounting or other commodities, and studies that explicitly explore
how people make health-related decisions. In the former category, these studies combine
traditional monetary discounting and various health-related scenarios. These health scenarios
will sometimes involve a hypothetical medical treatment, or some general preference in health
outcomes based on various delays or probabilities. In the latter category, the majority of these
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studies are typically focused on choosing between hypothetical medications or treatments that
vary in effectiveness, side effect severity, or delay to improvement or deterioration of health
conditions. Studies are ordered by research group and chronologically for each category. Due to
their relevance to the proposed study, each study that focuses on health or medical discounting
will be discussed in detail.
Health and Medical Decision-Making Compared to Other Commodities
Chapman & Elstein (1995) compared discount rates of between money, vacations, and
long-term health over two experiments. In the first experiment, discount rates were derived for
hypothetical lottery, vacation, and health scenarios for 70 undergraduate students. For all
scenarios across commodities, delays assessed were at 6 months and 1, 2, and 4 years. Questions
were fill-in-the-blank (FITB) format, where participants were asked to write the value of the
delayed prospect that would be equivalent to the immediate prospect. For example, participants
could either receive a hypothetical $200 now, or some value of their choosing two years from
now. For monetary questions, immediate values of $200, $1,000, $5,000, and $25,000 were used.
Vacation questions were presented as choosing between an immediate trip for some time, or a
participant chosen value after a delay. For vacations, the immediate value was two three, seven,
or 14-nights, and the location was varied between Galena, Florida, Bermuda, and Europe. Health
questions were presented as the participant were experiencing hypothetical symptoms and could
choose between an immediate treatment that would last some time, or a value of improved health
after a delay. For health, immediate values of improved health were six months, and one, two, or
four years. Discount rates were calculated using the formula r = (Vd / V0)1/d – 1, where Vd is the
reported value of the delayed option, V0 is the magnitude of the immediate option, and d is the
delay. A 4x3x3 ANOVA using log discount rates found significant main effects for delay,
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magnitude, and domain. Significant interactions were all identified. A factor analysis identified
that domains were relatively independent between each other, that is steep monetary discounters
were not also steep health discounters. Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1, with
only health and monetary questions conducted with 34 undergraduate students. Delays used were
one, three, six, and 12 years. Monetary magnitudes were adjusted to $500, $1,000, $2,000, and
$4,000, whereas health magnitudes were adjusted to one, two, four, and eight years. Much like in
the first experiment, health and monetary discounting were weakly correlated. Also, health
discounting rates were higher than monetary discount rates. In both experiments, higher
magnitude rewards were discounted less than smaller magnitude rewards.
In a series of three experiments Chapman (1996) compared health and monetary
discounting and their domain independence. The first experiment was identical to the second
experiment of Chapman and Elstein (1995). Discounting rates were also calculated the same way
as Chapman and Elstein (1995). Eight exchange rate questions were added, where participants
reported the worth in money or time in full health for each magnitude would be equivalent to the
alternative commodity. Forty undergrads were the participants of the first experiment. Results
were similar, in that discounting rates were higher for health outcomes than monetary outcomes,
but that the two domains appeared to be independent and weakly correlated. For exchange rates,
money was always weighted higher than health. Discount rates were not related to exchange
rates. Experiment 2 consisted assessing framing and the sign effect on monetary and health
outcomes. Monetary magnitudes were $500, $1,500, and $4,500, whereas health magnitudes
were .5, 1, and 1.5 years. The delays used were one and nine years. Magnitudes for money and
health were matched using the exchange procedure from the first experiment. There were 77
participants in the second experiment. Losses were less discounted than gains for money and
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health, and health was discounted more steeply than money. Domains were not correlated with
each other. The third experiment consisted of 38 undergrads who completed questions used to
derive utility functions. They would answer questions where they would fill in a value that would
subjectively equal the feeling of receiving $500 when they expected $0, but with the interval
ranging from $500 to their chosen value. The next interval tested would be $500 to their
identified value, for a total of four times. The function to determine utility was U = a(Qb) where
Q is quantity of health/money, and a and b were parameters specific to the participant, domain,
and sign. Utility functions were for money followed the traditional s-curve as in Tverksy and
Kahneman (1981), while utility functions for health were nearly straight diagonal lines.
Chapman et al. (2001) conducted a series of three experiments that compared
hypothetical monetary and health questions to real-world health behaviors. In the first
experiment, university faculty and staff were recruited via mailed questionnaires. These
questionnaires contained questions about flu-shot acceptance, monetary time preference, and
health time preference. Monetary time preference was assessed by a series of four questions
concerning paying a hypothetical fine now for a fixed price or a varied fine for fixed price after
four months. Health time preference was assessed in a similar way but for experiencing a flu
now for seven days or for a varied number of days after four months. Participants were also
mailed follow-up questionnaires at six months and a year to assess flu shot adherence and testretest reliability. Some participants were also asked if they invested in a retirement fund. The
results of the first experiment were indicative of no relationship between health time preferences
for either flu shot acceptance or retirement investments. Monetary time preference was
significantly but weakly correlated with flu shot acceptance. The second experiment consisted of
hypothetical hypertension scenarios for 195 older adults that were living in communities and
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being treated for hypertension. The health scenario involved a hypertension drug that decreased
some chest pain now, or another drug that decreased more chest pain later. Monetary scenarios
were phrased in a similar way but a with an immediate tax rebate against a larger, delayed tax
rebate. Indifference points were determined by a titrating procedure. Adherence measures were
also taken in the form of self-report, pill count, and blood pressure. Monetary time preference
was not related to medication adherence, although health time preferences were sometimes
weakly correlated with measures of adherence. The third experiment consisted of questions
about cholesterol to 169 patients currently being prescribed a cholesterol medication. The
hypertension from the previous experiment was used but changed so the hypothetical situation
involved them suffering from some heart condition that caused chest pain. Medication adherence
was determined by self-report and cholesterol levels. There was no significant correlation
between health time preference and medication adherence.
Baker et al. (2003) compared cigarette smokers and never smokers on discounting of
money, health, and cigarettes. Participants completed three sessions. The first session consisted
of standardized tests, and hypothetical health-value questions. Smokers also completed
hypothetical cigarette-value questions. Questions consisted of hypothetical scenarios of where a
participant identified what the equivalent duration a 10% improvement or decrement in health
was to be as attractive as $1,000. Cigarette equivalence was the same health, but with the number
of cigarettes being as attractive as $1,000 right now. The second session consisted of monetary,
health, and cigarette (for smokers) discounting questions. Participants would respond to
questions similar to the first session, but with varying delays associated using a titrating
procedure with adjusting limits to identify an indifference point. During these discounting
questions, gains and losses were tested, and three values of money ($10, $100, $1,000) were
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assessed. For smokers, cigarette discounting was compared at the same three values of money.
Health discounting was only comparing an improvement/decrement in health being as attractive
as $1,000. In the second session, participants also were able to choose between a real monetary
amount now or at a delay. Participants were randomly assigned to either a real monetary value of
$10 or $100. The third session was identical to the second session. There were 60 total
participants, with equal numbers of smokers and never smokers. Values of k were estimated
using the hyperbolic model. Smokers had higher k values on average when compared to never
smokers on all outcomes. For money, a 2x2x3 repeated measures ANOVA identified significant
main effects of smoking, magnitude, and sign, with significant interactions for smoking and
magnitude and sign and magnitude. For health, a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA identified a
significant main effect on sign, but not smoking. For real monetary outcomes, a 2x2x2 repeated
measures ANOVA identified main effects of smoking status and magnitude, with a significant
interaction between hypothetical/real and magnitude. Discount rates were higher for money than
health in smokers and never smokers.
Weatherly et al. (2010) compared 10 different commodities in a sample of 791
undergraduates. Using a FITB procedure, participants could indicate the monetary value of a
later option that would be equivalent to an immediate option of a commodity. Participants could
have either been given one of two sets of questions. The first set of questions consisted of
winning $1,000, winning $100,000, their ideal body image, their ideal romantic partner, and
cigarettes. The second set consisted of being owed $1,000, being owed $100,000, annual
retirement income, medical treatment, and federal legislation on education. In the case of the
medical treatment, the hypothetical situation was that a medication for a serious disease which
was 100% effective but only after some delay, participants would then indicate what was the
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minimum acceptable effectiveness for a medication available immediately. AUC was calculated
to determine discounting. Participants discounted being owed $1,000 more than any other
commodity. Medical treatment was discounted more than retirement income and federal
legislation. A factor analysis indicated that medical treatment was in a different factor from
being owed money or retirement.
Weatherly and Terrell (2011) conducted a direct replication of Weatherly et al. (2010)
with 236 undergraduates. AUC was calculated to determine discounting. Results of Weatherly
and Terrell (2011) were the same as Weatherly et al. (2010).
Weatherly et al. (2011) replicated and extended Weatherly et al. (2010) by assessing the
test-retest reliability of the FITB method with 115 undergraduates. Questions and sets were
identical to the previous Weatherly and colleague studies. Participants first completed either set
A or B, and then completed it again 12 weeks later. Both AUC and hyperbolic model were used
calculate discount rates to compare test-retest reliability. Estimates of k were log transformed
before statistical tests were conducted. In the case of all commodities, bivariate correlation was
generally high (-.617 to -.982) for log k and AUC at both time points. Generally, log k was found
to be more different from first to second tests than compared to AUC. When using AUC, medical
treatment discounting was not correlated between first and second tests (r = .019), while log k for
medical treatment was correlated (r = .639).
Weatherly and Derenne (2013) compared the test-retest reliability of two methods of
producing indifference points, the FITB method and a multiple-choice method. The multiplechoice method involved participants choosing on of 51 possible choices of their equivalent
probability or dollar value of a larger commodity which was relative to that certain commodity.
Participants were 233 undergraduate students who completed FITB or multiple choice (MC)
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versions of a probability task at zero, four, and 12 weeks. The hypothetical medical treatment
question involved a participant choosing the minimum percent of improvement produced by a
medical treatment relative to one that completely cures the disease for a certain percentage of
people who take it. Probability discounting rates calculated using the hyperbolic and GM
hyperboloid models, along with AUC. Medical treatment was generally less discounted than
other commodities on all metrics, while FITB generally appeared to be more reliable across time
than MC. Curves fit using the GM hyperboloid were considered the better model as determined
by AIC values than the hyperbolic for nearly all commodities and methods.
Weatherly and Derenne (2014) compared online and in-person data collection of
probability discounting as an extension and replication of Weatherly and Derenne (2013).
Participants were 650 undergraduates who completed either an in-person FITB or MC
probability discounting task, or an online FITB or MC discounting task. Questions used were the
same as Weatherly and Derenne (2013). Weatherly and Derenne (2014) found that there were
differences between group responses from in-person and online questions, and that MC questions
produced shallower discounting than FITB questions. Medical treatments were generally
discounted less than other commodities much like in previous probability discounting research.
Weatherly and Terrell (2014) studied differences in the magnitude effect for delay and
probability discounting of monetary and medical outcomes. Hypothetical questions were FITB,
where participants would indicate the minimum acceptable amount of money or success of
treatment now as opposed to a delayed larger outcome. This same question format was used for
probability discounting, with delay replaced by the probability of receiving the larger outcome.
For money, $100 and $100,000 were the small and large magnitudes respectively. For medical
treatments, acne treatment and brain cancer treatment were the small and large outcomes
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respectively. For the delay scenarios, 166 undergraduates completed the questionnaires. For
probability scenarios, 181 undergraduates completed the questionnaires. AUC was used to
calculated discounting. For delay, smaller magnitudes were discounted more than larger
magnitudes for monetary and medical outcomes. For probability discounting, the magnitude
effect occurred for both outcomes. However, the magnitude effect was inverted for monetary
outcomes (larger values were more steeply discounted) whereas this did not occur for medical
outcomes.
Sawicki and Markiewicz (2016) replicated and extended Weatherly and Terrell (2014) by
studying magnitude of monetary and medical treatments where medical outcomes were either
discrete or divisible. Procedures were identical to Weatherly and Terrell (2014), but some
questions compared body paralysis instead of brain cancer, and a visual analogue scale (VAS)
was used instead of FITB. The authors assessed delay and probability discounting. Participants
were also asked of their hypothetical worry for low- and high-intensity acne, brain cancer, and
body paralysis. AUC was used as the measure of discounting. Results of Weatherly and Terrell
(2014) were replicated by Sawicki and Markiewicz (2016) for discrete outcomes, but the
divisible outcome (body paralysis) behaved more similarly to monetary outcomes. However, for
probability the magnitude effect was not observed with divisible health outcomes. Participant’s
worry between high- and low-intensity outcomes was lower for brain cancer than acne and body
paralysis.
Friedel et al. (2016) replicated and extended Baker et al. (2003) by comparing
discounting of money and two different health commodities between smokers and nonsmokers.
Using an adjusting amount procedure, Friedel et al. (2016) used hypothetical questions similar to
Baker et al. (2003), with the exception of the larger monetary value being $500 rather than
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$1,000. Questions consisted of monetary gains, monetary losses, health gains much like Baker et
al. (2003), and a curative medical treatment based on the questions used in Odum et al. (2002).
These medical questions consisted of a hypothetical situation where participants were
experiencing AID-like symptoms following sex with a stranger. In this hypothetical medical
scenario, participants could choose between a medication that provided an immediate relief in
symptoms, or a delayed improvement in symptoms Participants were 38 smokers and 32
nonsmokers. Values of k were estimated using the hyperbolic and Rachlin hyperboloid models.
ED50 was also calculated for all participants and questions. Smokers overall had steeper
discounting for monetary gain, the health boost, and the health cure. Discounting was generally
correlated between health boost, health cures, and monetary gains. The hyperbolic model better
described nonsmoker’s discounting, whereas the Rachlin hyperboloid better described smoker’s
discounting.
Medical Decision-Making
Odum et al. (2002) compared discounting of health outcomes in current, ex-, and neversmokers. There were two scenarios assessed. The first health scenario presented participants a
situation, where following sex with an attractive stranger, they started experiencing health issues
(AIDs-like symptoms) and loss of friends as a result of it. Participants would then indicate
whether they would prefer a treatment that immediately improves their health for some duration,
or an outcome that improves their health for 10 years after a delay. There were 27 durations of
improvement ranging from 10 years to 0.01 years. Seven values from 3.6 days to 10 years were
assessed in an ascending/descending procedure. The second health scenario was similar to the
first, but instead of choosing between a treatment, participants would choose between
immediately experiencing 10 years or symptoms, or 10 years of symptoms following the same
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delays used in the first scenario. Participants were 23 current smokers, 22 never smokers, and 21
ex-smokers. Values of k were derived from the exponential and hyperbolic models. Generally,
current smokers discount gains and losses more steeply than ex- and never-smokers. Ex-smokers
discounted between current and never-smokers but were not statistically different from either
group. Smokers and ex-smokers discounted health losses more than gains, but this did not occur
for never-smokers. In all cases but individual data for health gains, the hyperbolic model
provided better fits than the exponential model.
Bruce et al. (2015) using discounting methods to assess medication adherence by patients
with multiple sclerosis (MS). Bruce et al. used the Medical Decision Making Questionnaire
(MDMQ) which is a VAS where an individual can mark off how likely they are to engage in
some health behavior (i.e., medication adherence) at some probability of side effect. For chronic
diseases, adherence to disease-modifying treatment (DMT) is often problematic due to side
effects that result from the DMT. Participants were divided into two categories, the 39 who were
adherent to MS medication, and 38 were not adherent. Participant adherence was determined by
their self-reports of the participants in a screening questionnaire. In this study, the MDMQ
consisted of series of questions with hypothetical DMTs with varying medication efficacies
against 10%, 50%, and 90% chance of adverse side effects. Participants then selected on the
MDMQ how likely they would be to take that particular medication. Probability discounting
parameters were determined by the hyperbolic and GM hyperboloid models. AUC was also
calculated for the three probabilities of side effect. Bruce et al. found that those who reported
being non-adherent had higher h values (i.e., were less likely to take medications) than those who
were identified as adherent. This difference was consistent across all side effect values. AUC
also consistently decreased (i.e., less adherence) based on increased risk of side effect. The
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curves fit with the GM hyperboloid provided better fits to the data than hyperbolic model. AUC
and demographic variables were used in a logistic regression model to predict medication
adherence. AUC of 10% side effects was the only significant (p < .05) predictor of medication
adherence.
Jarmolowicz et al. (2016) reanalyzed MDMQ data from Bruce et al. (2015) to calculate
an effective probability for medication adherence where individuals would be indifferent (EP50).
To do this, the formula to determine ED50 was adapted to odds against EΘ50 = 1/h, and then
converted to EP50 via the formula EP50 = 1 / (EΘ50 + 1). A 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA
determined that there were significant main effects of group and side effect, as well as interaction
between group and side effect. They also extrapolated the likely times when an adherent
individual would no longer take medication as per EP50, as well as the inverse of a non-adherent
individual taking medications. Jarmolowicz et al. found that there were overlaps between groups
when the EP50 measure was used.
Jarmolowicz et al. (2017) used a modified version of the MDMQ (seven values of
effectiveness and three severities) to assess medication adherence for persons with MS. Fortytwo participants with MS completed this modified MDMQ. The Equation fit to the data at each
of the three severities was V = A / (1 + hθ), where A and h were free parameters to be estimated.
In this case, A was considered the likelihood a participant was to take a medication with 100%
effectiveness at various side effects. The model fit was good for all three severities at the
individual level (median R2 of .91, .92, and .94 for mild, moderate, and severe side effects
respectively). The fitted value of A also varied systematically by severity, with the unadjusted
likelihoods decreasing as severity increased. They also found that AUC values were strongly
correlated (r > .5) with self-reports of motivation to take DMTs.
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Bruce, Jarmolowicz, et al. (2018) used an adapted version of the MDMQ (medical
decision-making task; MDMT) and a shorter health decisions questionnaire (HDQ) to assess how
participants with MS would take a hypothetical DMT based on effectiveness and side effects
(e.g., mild, moderate, or severe). The MDMT consisted of 11 values ranging from 0.1% to
99.9% for probabilities of effectiveness and side effects. A total of 290 participants completed
the MDMQ and 282 completed the HDQ. Repeated measures ANOVAs indicated differences on
how participants were likely to take a drug based on side effect severity and effectiveness.
Traditional discounting measures (e.g., h, AUC) were not included in this study.
Bruce, Bruce, et al. (2018) used the MDMT to assess decision-making in persons with
MS. In this study, a three-dimensional model of probability discounting was used. The threedimensional model was as follows, V = U / [(1 + hseΘse Sse) x (1 + heΘe Se)]. This model consisted
of the usual numerator (unadjusted value), with A replaced with U as the unadjusted likelihood of
taking a medication at perfect efficacy. The discounting parameters for side effect and efficacy
were hse and he respectively. The parameters Θse and Θe were the odds against side effect and
efficacy, and Sse and Se were the sensitivity parameters of side effects and efficacy respectively.
It should be noted that in this model U was a free parameter and could take values that were not
100%. A total of 225 participants with MS completed the MDMT. Because of positive skew and
kurtosis for discounting of side effect and efficacy, participants were divided into three groups,
low (0–25th percentile), average (26–74th percentile) and high (75–100th percentile).
Participants who were in the low hse category were more likely to be adherent based on selfreport, while participants categorized as high hse were less likely to be adherent. Those that were
categorized as high he performed more poorly than those in other groups on cognitive tests. The
three-dimensional model performed well, with a mean R2 of .9 (SD = .09).
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Jarmolowicz, Reed, Bruce, et al. (2018) used the same three-dimensional model in
conjunction with the MDMT as described in Bruce, Bruce, et al. (2018) for 299 persons with
MS. Results from a repeated measures ANOVA indicated significant main effects of side-effect
severity, side-effect probability, and DMT efficacy. The three-dimension model fits to mean
participant likelihoods were high, with R2 values of .96, .97, and .98 for mild, moderate, and
severe side effects respectively. Significant differences were also identified for all estimated
parameters based on side-effect severity.
Asgarova et al. (2017) examined the effects of framing on the probability discounting of
taking a cardiovascular drug. Thirty-six Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers were
recruited and completed a series of questions regarding a hypothetical cardiovascular treatment.
Questions were framed as either number of people out of 100 who have good health (positive
frame) following taking a cardiovascular drug for a period of five years, or the number of people
who experienced an adverse cardiovascular event (negative frame) in a five-year period. In both
these cases the number of people who experienced good health or an adverse event was
presented with the number of people who experienced either without taking the drug. These
frames were tested against two types of side effect as a result of medication, frequent headaches
or cold feet. In this study, indifference points were determined as the point when participants
switched their decision from taking the drug to not taking it, or vice versa. Questions were
presented using a titrating procedure to determine the indifference points for each participant at
various risk/benefits. The probability discounting parameter h was derived from these points
using the hyperbolic model. AUC was also calculated for side effect and frame. Asgarova et al.
found that while there was a significant difference between side effect of drug, there was not a
significant difference between the positive and negative frames. Fits of the hyperbolic model to
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participant probability curves were generally high, with median R2 values ranging from .86 to .96
between the four conditions.
Jarmolowicz, Reed, Francisco, et al. (2018) applied discounting methodology to
decisions to vaccinate based on social distance. Fifty participants were recruited from MTurk, 20
of which were parents. Only one parent did not vaccinate their child from this group. Participants
were first required to create a “social network”, whereby they would imagine that the people
closest to them as their closest relatives as 1 of 100, and someone as 100 units of distance as a
virtual stranger. For parents, their child was a distance of 0. They were then required to name and
state their relationships for the 3rd, 5th, 10, and 20th social distances. Following this, participants
were given information about mild and moderate-to-severe side effects. They then completed a
vaccine decision-making task which presented hypothetical vaccine with varying effects of
protection, and participants then responded with the highest risk they were willing based on
symptom severity. AUC was calculated at all social distances of 0, 5, 20, 50, and 100 for mild
and moderate-to-severe side effects. In all cases, AUC was higher for mild side effects (i.e.,
people were more likely to vaccinate when risks were mild). For all data, four different
discounting equations were compared for model fits. These were the exponential, hyperbolic,
GM hyperboloid, and Rachlin hyperboloid models. Jarmolowicz, Reed, Francisco, et al. found
that the Rachlin hyperboloid model provided the best fits to the data.
Nese et al. (2020) used discounting based procedures similar to Bruce et al. (2016) and
Jarmolowicz, Reed, Francisco, et al. (2018) to determine compliance to COVID-19 containment
measures. Participants were 931 Italians who responded to a survey between March 29th and
April 4th of 2020 (i.e., following the initial and major damage of the COVID-19 pandemic in
Italy). The questions asked Nese et al. (2020) consisted scenarios involving various risks of
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contracting COVID-19 (10%, 50%, and 90%) and time in isolation (0, 7, 14, 30, 60, 90, 180
days). Participants would then select how acceptable terminating isolation was via a VAS.
Participants also completed general anxiety metrics and psychological needs questionnaires.
Discounting measures were assessed via AUC. Acceptable compliance was affected by risk of
transmission, lower levels of transmission allowing for more permissible breaks of compliance
over longer periods of time. AUC was correlated with perceived risk, but other measures were
generally not correlated or weakly correlated with AUC (rs < .2). At higher levels of risk,
discounting did not appear to follow the traditional hyperbolic curve, but instead was more
linear. Discounting at low risk of contracting COVID-19 followed a more typical discounting
curve.
Rzeszutek et al. (under review) used discounting methodology to determine how
individuals might remove a potentially cancerous tumor based on delay, risk, and surgical cost
over two experiments. In the first experiment, 50 MTurk workers completed hypothetical
monetary and medical decision-making questions. Monetary questions compared smaller-sooner
values of a 99% change of $500 within a week against $1000 dollars with probabilities of 1%,
20%, 50%, 80% and 99% at delays of one week, six months, and two, five, and 15 years. These
delays and probabilities were used for all monetary and medical decision-making questions.
Participants would then use a VAS to determine how likely they were to choose between the
smaller option and the delayed option. For monetary questions, participants were presented with
gaining money at the previous values or losing money at those values. Following this,
participants were then presented with scenarios where they had been diagnosed with a tumor that
had a chance to become malignant after a given delay. Probabilities and delays were identical to
the monetary decision-making questions. Participants would use a VAS to indicate how likely
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they were to have the tumor surgically removed. Identical questions were presented but reframed
as the tumor remaining benign, and probabilities inverted, thereby yielding mathematically
equivalent cancer probabilities between frames. After completing the full set of remain benign or
become malignant questions, participants were presented with questions that were identical to
the become malignant scenario with the addition of a surgical costs of $100, $1,000, $10,000,
and $100,000 to remove the tumor. Discounting was calculated using AUClog for curves at all
probabilities and delays. Discounting values decreased as probability of cancer decreased and
delay to cancer increased. Participants were more likely to remove a tumor if the situation was
framed as becoming malignant rather than as remaining benign. The sign effect also occurred for
monetary discounting, where gains were more steeply discounted than losses. The second
experiment was similar to the first, with the exception that the monetary and “free” medical
discounting questions were replaced with the tumor would remain benign scenario at the
previously stated costs of removal. Results were similar to the first experiment, in that malignant
frames produced higher endorsements of tumor removal, and that probability, delay, and cost
affected decision-making. A novel metric, volume under the surface (VUS), was also calculated
by generalizing AUC to three-dimensional discounting. Because odds against and large
differences in delays were used, scales were log transformed resulting in VUSlog. This novel
discounting measure was useful in identifying overall discounting at each surgical cost and
frame. Framing and cost were still significantly different at all costs, but there was no significant
interaction between frame and cost. The sign effect was consistent throughout all costs and
probabilities. Monetary discounting did not appear to be related to medical discounting as based
on VUSlogs.
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Summary of Health Discounting
As evidenced by the studies reviewed, there is much heterogeneity in the nature of the
health questions used to assess health and medical discounting. For example, studies by
Chapman (1996), Odum et al. (2002), Baker et al. (2003), and Friedel et al. (2016) used health
questions that compared an immediate improvement followed by deterioration relative to a
delayed improvement. Studies by Weatherly and colleagues and Sawicki and Markiewicz (2016)
involved asking participants the percentage of treatment efficacy for an immediate option being
equivalent to an effective treatment after a delay. All of these studies varied in whether a
participant was required to provide an equivalent value for the alternative outcome, choose
between outcomes, or an acceptable effectiveness. By contrast, studies by Bruce, Jarmolowicz,
and colleagues, Nese et al. (2020), and Rzeszutek et al. (under review) asked participants how
likely they’re going to accept a given medication or treatment, or the acceptability of some
health-related behavior. Asgarova et al (2017) was different from studies by Bruce, Jarmolowicz,
and colleagues, Nese et al. (2020), and Rzeszutek et al. (under review) as Asgarova et al. (2017)
used a choice procedure to assess acceptability of a hypothetical treatment.
When it was assessed, the relationship between health-related discounting was not related
to actual health behaviors (Chapman, 1996; Chapman et al. 2001; also see Chapman, 2005).
Indeed, in the review by Story et al. (2014), monetary discounting was related to health
behaviors, but health discounting was not. However, studies that assessed medication adherence
did find relationships to real medical decisions and health discounting (Bruce et al., 2016;
Jarmolowicz, et al., 2016). This could be due to the nature of the questions used to assess health
discounting. Situations used were at times atypical to decisions a person may actually face. For
example, one may never have to explicitly decide between 10 years of good health now followed
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by bad health or 10 years of bad health now followed by 10 years of good health. And while
some questions (Baker et al., 2003; Friedel et al. 2016; Odum et al. 2002) may be more similar to
a decision one might face, because the situation was using AIDs-like symptoms, only a small
proportion of the population are HIV positive (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
CDC, 2020b) and therefore most people will not have direct experience with these types of
situations. Contrast this with questions used by Bruce, Jarmolowicz, and colleagues, who used
questions about a hypothetical DMT for those who actively use DMTs to treat a condition. The
ecological validity of the discounting questions may be particularly relevant to determine a
connection between monetary discounting and health-discounting, and potentially health-related
behaviors.
Identifying Appropriate Methods to Assess Medical Discounting
While the reviewed studies used a variety of different methods (i.e., binary choice, FITB,
MC, VAS) and response formats (i.e., equivalent worth, subjective likelihood) to derive
indifference points, some formats appear to be more appropriate than others for particular
research questions. For example, Smith and Hantula (2008) compared binary-choice methods to
FITB procedures to assess generation of indifference points for monetary discounting. They
argue that each method has its shortcomings but found that participants viewed FITB procedures
were more ‘cognitively demanding.’ This appears to stem from the procedural requirement
within FITB that participants must generate an equivalent value for the alternative option rather
than choosing between two presented options. Although binary-choice procedures are dominant
in discounting research, there is no methodological consensus with regard to discounting
procedures (see Weatherly, 2014).
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Lack of consensus aside, in the case of medical discounting, the studies by Bruce,
Jarmolowicz, and colleagues, the VAS provided indifference points that fit hyperbola-based
models of discounting quite well. This could be partly due to the similarity between the
experimental task and the way a person may actually weigh two options. In this case, the options
were to take or to not take a hypothetical DMT, where participant likelihood to take the DMT
refers to subjective uncertainty of a participant’s behavior, in contrast to participant’s subjective
value of a commodity. For example, Bruce et al. (2016) asked participants how likely they were
to take a given DMT based on its side effects. If a participant reported 100% at efficacy versus
side effect, that is equivalent to yes, 0% is equivalent to no, and ranges in between 0–100%
represent subjective likelihood of engaging in a given behavior at that level of efficacy and side
effect. It may be easier for participants to generate a percent likelihood of engaging in a behavior
instead of identifying an equivalent DMT efficacy value relative to some other DMT efficacy
with side effects due to fewer competing sources of control. In contrast, consider Chapman and
Elstein (1995) where participants were asked to determine the equivalent number of years of full
health after a delay would be needed to equal a year of full health. In these cases, participants
have to identify what ‘full health’ means, but they also will probably consider their current age,
situations that may occur within the next year, and what ‘full health’ after that delay means to
them. It is substantially more effortful for participants to complete equivalence tasks when
compare to a likelihood task. In the case of asking participants, “How likely are you to do X”,
they only source of stimulus control is the question, and perhaps their covert verbal behavior as
they produce a response. Compared to questions that ask for an equivalence of health following a
delay, the question is exerting control on responding, but participants are also required to engage
in more covert verbal behavior to generate conditioned stimuli relative to the question at hand.
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For example, the question may evoke a statement such as, “What will I feel like after aging a
year, and what does good health mean?”, which in turn acts requires at least two more responses
to be produced, one to the ‘feel after a year’, and another to ‘what does good health mean’. These
new statements then act new sources of control, and so on. All these verbal responses are now
new sources of stimulus control introduced following the initial equivalence-based discounting
question. This could account for the previously mentioned “cognitively demanding” nature of the
certain formats of discounting questions. More sources of control “compete” and decrease the
likelihood of response being produced until enough stimuli and responses bring the terminal
response to strength (i.e., the equivalent value).3 Also, in the case of day-to-day medical
decision-making, if an individual had a concerning symptom and was debating on seeking
medical assistance, it is unlikely they would identify the equivalent value of some other
symptom relative to their current symptom at some other time. They would probably be more
likely to determine they will go, will not go, or debate on going to seek medical assistance for the
symptom at hand. The debate and deliberation process (i.e., covert verbal behavior and problem
solving) is captured in values from 0-100%. Also, in an attempt to adapt Rzeszutek et al. (under
review) into an equivalence-based discounting scenario, it is not clear what a participant could be
asked to provide an equivalence for a tumor becoming potentially cancerous after a delay. To ask
participants, “You have a cancerous tumor now for some years, what is the cancerous tumor later
for some years that would be equivalent” seems to be an impossible scenario and lacks face
validity.

3

A more detailed description of possible problem-solving during hypothetical-choice situations is outside the scope
of the current paper, but book-length treatments of language and cognition from behavior-analytic perspectives are
available (e.g., Hayes et al., 2001; Skinner, 1957).
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Therefore, when considering medical decision-making, the method (i.e., binary choice,
FITB, MC, VAS) may not matter, but the format of the response required by participants seems
to be particularly important. Requiring identification of equivalent values, especially for medical
decision-making, may not be appropriate. That is not to say equivalence-based discounting
questions are inherently bad, but instead that they may be measuring some other variable rather
than acting as a measurement of medical decision-making. How different methods affect
indifference points is an empirical question, but a question that is outside of the scope of the
current study. In the case of discounting specific medical decisions, the VAS is the most popular
and best supported based on fits to hyperbola-based models of discounting.
The Present Study
For the majority of studies reviewed, health discounting situations presented were either
unrealistic (e.g., hypothetical good health now or later; Chapman and colleagues), too specific
(e.g., comparing AIDS-like symptoms now or later; Friedel et al., 2016; Odum et al., 2002) or
used unique populations that have real experience with the hypothetical scenarios (e.g., patients
with MS and their experience with DMTs; Bruce and colleagues). Other studies that examined
somewhat more common treatments (e.g., acne treatment; Sawicki & Markiewicz, 2016;
Weatherly & Terrell, 2014) only studied one or two types of treatments with more emphasis on
cross-commodity effects rather than medical decision-making per se. These were also done in a
way that some form of equivalence was requested rather than likelihood of choice. In studies that
were asked participants how likely they were to take a hypothetical treatment (e.g., Asgarova et
al., 2017; Bruce et al., 2015; Jarmolowicz, Reed, Francisco, et al., 2018), comparisons to
traditional monetary discounting were not made. Because cross-commodity comparisons were
done typically with unrealistic or unlikely scenarios, they may not have been fair comparisons
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and could be why inconsistencies between health and monetary discounting occurred. In the
study by Rzeszutek et al. (under review), one experiment assessed differences in medical and
monetary decision making, but combined probability and delay discounting assessed via VUSlog,
which makes it difficult to isolate why there was no apparent relationship between monetary and
medical decision-making. And while the magnitude effect between medical and monetary
discounting has been studied (Sawicki & Markiewicz, 2016; Weatherly & Terrell, 2014), the
discounting questions were based on equivalence of the alternative option rather than likelihood
of choosing an outcome. Therefore, the purpose of the current study was to assess the
discounting common health symptoms and their relationship between delay and probability
monetary discounting using methods with greater face validity.
In the case of the current study, the common symptoms to be assessed were cough,
headaches, and nausea, as everyone would likely have experienced these symptoms at least once
in their lifetimes. Participants were presented with questions asking how likely they are to seek a
medical professional after experiencing a given symptom for varying durations. This is because
it provides insight on general health-related decision-making, but it can also inform how
individuals avoid seeking help for mild but persistent symptoms which could be indicative of
more severe health problems (e.g., cancer). Delay and probability monetary discounting were
assessed and directly compared to determine if impulsivity or risk (as determined by monetary
discounting) has a relationship to this form of medical decision-making. Magnitude was assessed
for monetary discounting and medical discounting. In this way, correlations between the size of
the magnitude effect in monetary and medical decision-making can be explored. Lastly, much
like Rzeszutek et al. (under review) various cost of utilization was assessed at varying severities,
as this appears to be a key factor in health utilization. This allowed for assessing the relationship
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between impulsive and risky decision-making relative to health-related scenarios that individuals
are likely to experience or have experienced in their lives. Procedurally, all the medical decisionmaking questions in this study were novel, as well as the factors being compared between
monetary and medical decision-making.
There were three experiments. The first assessed delay and probability discounting
relative to symptom and severity. This allowed initial comparisons of risk, impulsivity, and
medical decision-making. Because a health decision can be conceptualized as either a gain or a
loss (i.e., a medical professional could either provide an individual with a treatment, or the
medical professional could give a undesirable diagnosis), the sign effect was explored to
determine if monetary losses or gains were related to medical decision-making. The second
experiment assessed discounting of symptom severity relative to cost to access healthcare. The
purpose of this experiment was to determine if there was an interaction between symptom,
severity, and cost. It was expected that decision-making for high severity symptoms will be more
resistant to effects of cost, but costs will still decrease the likelihood of seeking medical services
much like Rzeszutek et al. (under review). This second experiment also acted as a partial
replication of the first experiment. The third experiment compared delay and probability
discounting, symptom severity, and cost to access healthcare. The purpose of the third study was
to determine if and how the relationship between monetary discounting and medical decisionmaking change due to costs to the individual. This third experiment also served as a partial
replication for the other two experiments.
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General Methods
The following section describes common methods used across all three experiments.
After covering these general methods, each experiment will have its own section for specific
methods, results, and discussion.
Recruitment
Recruitment for each experiment consisted of Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
workers, with 200 participants per study. To be able to access the survey, participants must (1)
live in the United States, (2) have a 95% acceptance rate on MTurk, and (3) have completed over
100 HITs. The 95% acceptance rate and completed requirements are criteria that are standard
benchmarks for quality assurance in academic survey research conducted on MTurk (Robinson
et al., 2019). Each participant who successfully completed the survey and provided a valid code
received $3.50. Those that failed the screener or did not provide a valid completion code were
not compensated.
Survey Platform
The online platform Qualtrics was used to distribute the surveys.
Screener, Attention Check, and Captcha
Before accessing the experimental surveys, participants completed a brief percentage
comprehension task using sliders (i.e., VAS; Appendix A). This brief task provided instructions
and example of how to use the sliders, followed by four questions where participants are required
to select the correct percentage. If a participant incorrectly answered these four questions, they
were removed from the study. If a participant correctly answered these screener questions, the
continued onto one of the three experimental surveys. At the end of the decision-making
questions, an attention check was included to aid in removing potentially low-quality data. This
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attention check question was “Would you rather have $1,000 immediately or $1 in a year”. If a
participant selected a value of higher than 5 on the corresponding slider that ranged from 0 to
100, their data were excluded from analysis. Following removal of participant data based on the
attention check, if a participant answered yes to the question involving underlying health
conditions, but then said something like “No underlying health conditions” that would contradict
their previous response, their data were also removed from the dataset. At the end of the survey
but prior to the unique completion code, participants were required to complete a Captcha. This
was to decrease the likelihood of bots (i.e., non-human automated scripts) from completing the
survey and gaining compensation.
Demographics, and General Health Questions
Following completion of the experimental questions, all participants completed a series
demographic and health-related questions. These consisted of general concern related to the
symptoms and severities, health insurance status, smoking assessed by the Fagerström Test for
Nicotine Dependence (Heatherton et al., 1991), general health by the Short Form Health Survey
(SF-12; Ware et al., 1996), trust in doctors (Dugan et al., 2005), delaying/avoiding real medical
procedures due to cost, and other general demographics (See Appendices C–I).
Common Discounting Parameters Across Experiments
For all experiments, common values were used to assess decision-making and will be
discussed here. All questions involving monetary delays assessed decision-making between a
smaller, sooner ($500 or $5,000) amount and a larger, later ($1,000 or $10,000) amount at delays
to the larger amount at 1 day, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, and 2 years. All questions involving
monetary choices between a small, certain ($500 or $5,000) amount and a larger, uncertain
($1,000 or $10,000) amount and probabilities of receiving the uncertain amount of 99%, 80%,

38

50%, 20%, and 1%. All questions involving health decision-making used duration of symptoms
experienced at 6 hours, 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, and 6 months. In all cases, delays and durations
were always presented in an ascending order, whereas probabilities were presented in a
descending order. In the case of health discounting, experienced symptoms were always
headache, nausea, or coughing. See Appendix J for examples and values used across
experiments.
Data Analysis
For all data manipulation and statistical calculations, the statistical programming
environment R 4.03 (R Core Team, 2020) and data.table package (Dowle & Srinivasan, 2020)
were used. To calculate decision-making during tasks, AUCord was calculated for all conditions.
Indifference points at a given delay, probability, or duration of symptoms were simply the
participant response at the delay, probability, or duration of symptoms assessed. To make
appropriate comparisons between loss and gain monetary frames, indifference points from loss
frame questions were subtracted from 100 to produce a descending curve rather than an
ascending curve produced based on the VAS methods used. Because AUCord is a proportion, beta
regression was used as the beta distribution is better able to handle proportions when compared
to linear models with assumptions of normally distributed data. Because of the repeated
measures nature of the study, mixed-effects beta regressions were used with the variables of
interest (i.e., frame, probability, delay, cost) as fixed effects and participants as the random
effect. Mixed-effects beta regressions were conducted using the glmmTMB package (Brooks et
al., 2017). Because the beta regression implementation in the glmmTMB package cannot handle
explicit 0s and 1s, those values were converted to 0.0001 and 0.9999 respectively. To assess the
overall significance of fixed effects, Wald tests using type-II sums of squares were conducted for
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all mixed-model regressions via the car package (Fox & Weisberg, 2019). In all cases,
regressions included interactions between factors when interactions could be assessed. Spearman
correlations and corrections for multiple comparisons were conducted using the psych package
(Revelle, 2020). The Holm-Bonferroni method was used to correct for multiple comparisons. To
determine associations between demographic factors and their relationship to monetary
discounting and health decision-making, MANOVAs with Pillai’s Trace were conducted with
the car package using general linear models and separated by delay, probability, and/or symptom
when applicable. All MANOVAs included age, socioeconomic status (SES), gender, ethnicity,
smoking status, health insurance status, trust in doctors, the physical component score (PCS) and
mental component summary (MCS) measures from the SF-12, underlying health condition, and
having avoided/delayed seeking healthcare due to cost.
To compare different models of discounting, Gilroy et al.’s (2017) model selector was
used to determine the most probable model (i.e., noise, exponential, hyperbolic, GM
hyperboloid, Rachlin hyperboloid). For questions involving loss frames and health questions,
participant response values were inverted so that the values across times or probabilities were
descending. This is because typical discounting equations assume a decrease in value over time,
rather than an increase in value as expected in the health decision-making questions. For
posterity, the Johnson and Bickel (JB; 2008) algorithm to assess discounting data was applied to
all data paths that were included following screening. The two criteria assessed via the JB
algorithm to assess non-systematic discounting are that no indifference point is higher than 20%
of the total subjective value than the previous indifference point (bounce), and that the first
indifference point is at least 10% of the total subjective value higher than the last indifference
point (sensitivity). No data were removed if they failed to meet either or both JB criteria.
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For demographic variables, income and education were combined in to a three-tier SES
indicator based on Sheffer et al., (2017). Income and education were each assigned a value,
added together, and then combined to create the three tiers. This SES scale has 1 as the lowest
SES and 3 as the highest SES. Reported gender was sorted into “male”, “female”, or “other”.
Ethnicity was grouped into “Caucasian”, “Asian”, “Black/African”, “Hispanic/Latin”, and
“other”. Trust in doctors was aggregated across the five questions into a single value. Health
insurance status was converted to either a participant having coverage (i.e., “yes”) or not (i.e.,
“no”).
Experiment 1
Methods
The first experiment consisted of delay and probability monetary discounting scenarios,
followed by experienced symptoms scenarios. First, participants were randomly assigned to
complete either delay or probability discounting for monetary outcomes. In all cases, they were
always presented with discounting questions first of small monetary gains ($500 vs $1,000), then
large monetary gains ($5,000 vs $10,000), then small monetary losses ($500 vs $1,000), and
finally large monetary losses ($5,000 vs $10,000). After completing the delay or probability
discounting questions, they then completed the alternative. For example, if they first completed a
set of probability discounting questions, they then completed a set of delay discounting questions
and vice versa. After completing both delay and probability discounting of monetary outcomes,
participants completed health decision-making questions. Order of health symptoms (coughing,
headache, and nausea) was randomly determined but the severity of symptoms (mild, moderate,
and severe) was always presented as increasing severities for a given symptom. For example, if a
participant completed decision-making questions regarding headaches first, they would complete
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a set of questions with mild headache severity over ascending durations, then moderate headache
severity, and finally severe headache severity. Therefore, there were a total of 40 monetary
discounting questions and 35 health decision-making questions participants in Experiment 1
completed.
Results
Screening, Duration, and Estimated Compensation
Following screening there were data from 165 participants were deemed as being usable
(82.5%). Median time to survey completion was 16.67 minutes (min = 5.53, max = 69.82).
Therefore, compensation based on median time to completion was $12.60/hr.
Demographics
The participant demographics for Experiment 1 can be found in Table 1. The majority of
participants identified as male (61.2%) and white (74.5%). Mean age was 39.2. Most had some
form of health insurance coverage (86.1%) and had employment outside of MTurk (78.8%).

Table 1. Experiment 1 Demographics
n/mean %/SD
39.2
11.1

Age
Gender
Male
Female
Other

101
64
0

61.2
38.8
0

Caucasian
Asian
Black/African
Hispanic/Latin
Other
Other Employment
No
Lost Employment
Yes
SES Bracket
1-Low
2-Medium

123
18
14
10
0

74.5
10.9
8.5
6.1
0

35

21.2

5

3

12
47

7.3
28.5

Ethnicity

42

3-High
106
64.2
Health Insurance
Medicaid/Medicare
40
24.2
Insured
88
53.3
Family/Spouse
14
8.5
Uninsured
23
13.9
Lost Health Insurance
Yes
1
0.6
Smoker
Yes
35
21.2
SF-12
PCS
16.9
3
MCS
18
3.1
Delayed Healthcare
Yes
66
40
Avoided Healthcare
Yes
63
38.2
Either Avoided or Delayed
Yes
73
44.2
Underlying Conditions
Yes
42
25.5
Trust in Doctors
16.5
4.2
Note. For discrete variables, the number of
participants and percentage of sample are
included. For continuous variables, mean and
SD are included. SF-12 maximum scores are 20
and 27 for PCS (Physical Component Summary)
and MCS (Multiple Component Summary)
respectively. Trust in doctors maximum score is
25. Both lost employment and healthcare refer to
losing either due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
SES strata were determined by combining
income and education into a composite score
based on Sheffer et al. (2017).

Monetary Discounting
Table 2 is correlation matrix of Spearman correlations of all behavioral outcomes (i.e.,
monetary discounting and health decision-making) calculated by AUCord in Experiment 1. Delay
discounting measures were generally strongly correlated with each other, while not correlated
with probability discounting measures. There were some small correlations between delay
discounting of losses and probability discounting, but after corrections for multiple comparisons
only one significant relationship remained between delay discounting of large losses and
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probability discounting of large losses. For delay discounting, there was a significant difference
for the loss frame, χ2(1) = 37.09, p < .0001, and magnitude, χ2(1) = 15.59, p < .0001. There was a
non-significant interaction between loss and magnitude, χ2(1) = 3.16, p = .0753. Both loss and
large magnitudes increased AUCord (i.e., decreased discounting). For probability discounting,
only the loss frame was significant, χ2(1) = 165.22, p < .0001, where as there was no statistical
evidence of the magnitude effect, χ2(1) = 0.51, p = .4731, or interaction between loss and
magnitude, χ2(1) = 0.41, p = .5206. Much like for delay discounting, the loss frame increased
AUCord of probability discounting (i.e., decreased discounting). Figure 1 is a boxplot of AUCord
of delay and probability discounting by loss frame and magnitudes.
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix of Behavioral Measures Based on AUCords from Experiment 1
Variable

1

1. DD S +

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

0.89**

0.51**

0.48**

0.09

-0.08

0.12

0.19

-0.28*

-0.23

-0.14

-0.39**

-0.34**

-0.18

-0.22

-0.16

-0.07

0.58**

0.58**

0.08

-0.08

0.09

0.18

-0.33**

-0.27*

-0.15

-0.44**

-0.42**

-0.2

-0.24

-0.2

-0.05

0.01

-0.09

0.16

0.24

-0.36**

-0.25

-0.19

-0.44**

-0.4**

-0.19

-0.25

-0.18

-0.03

-0.03

-0.12

0.18

0.27*

-0.28*

-0.22

-0.09

-0.41**

-0.35**

-0.15

-0.2

-0.17

0.04

0.77**

-0.19

-0.1

0.08

0.14

0.09

0

-0.03

0.02

0.03

0.04

-0.06
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2. DD L +

0.89**

3. DD S -

0.51**

0.58**

4. DD L -

0.48**

0.58**

0.77**

5. PD S +

0.09

0.08

0.01

6. PD L +

-0.08

-0.08

-0.09

-0.12

0.77**

7. PD S -

0.12

0.09

0.16*

0.18*

-0.19*

-0.14

8. PD L -

0.19*

0.18*

0.24**

0.27**

-0.1

-0.1

0.73**

9. Mi H

-0.28**

-0.33**

-0.36**

-0.28**

0.08

0.06

-0.11

-0.17*

10. Mo H

-0.23**

-0.27**

-0.25**

-0.22**

0.14

0.14

-0.01

-0.04

0.82**

11. Se H

-0.14

-0.15*

-0.19*

-0.09

0.09

0.07

-0.01

-0.03

0.71**

0.82**

12. Mi C

-0.39**

-0.44**

-0.44**

-0.41**

0

0.06

-0.03

-0.16*

0.7**

0.6**

0.5**

13. Mo C

-0.34**

-0.42**

-0.4**

-0.35**

-0.03

0.04

-0.02

-0.11

0.72**

0.68**

0.61**

0.87**

14. Se C

-0.18*

-0.2*

-0.19*

-0.15

0.02

0.03

-0.03

-0.07

0.59**

0.65**

0.66**

0.66**

0.81**

15. Mi N

-0.22**

-0.24**

-0.25**

-0.2**

0.03

-0.01

-0.13

-0.1

0.7**

0.63**

0.6**

0.63**

0.67**

0.61**

16. Mo N

-0.16*

-0.2*

-0.18*

-0.17*

0.04

0

-0.06

-0.03

0.65**

0.69**

0.71**

0.6**

0.67**

0.7**

0.81**

17. Se N

-0.07

-0.05

-0.03

0.04

-0.06

-0.09

0.01

0.03

0.48**

0.57**

0.72**

0.41**

0.53**

0.7**

0.63**

0.77**
-0.03

-0.14

-0.1

0.06

0.14

0.07

0.06

0.04

0.03

-0.01

0

-0.09

0.73**

-0.11

-0.01

-0.01

-0.03

-0.02

-0.03

-0.13

-0.06

0.01

-0.17

-0.04

-0.03

-0.16

-0.11

-0.07

-0.1

-0.03

0.03

0.82**

0.71**

0.7**

0.72**

0.59**

0.7**

0.65**

0.48**

0.82**

0.6**

0.68**

0.65**

0.63**

0.69**

0.57**

0.5**

0.61**

0.66**

0.6**

0.71**

0.72**

0.87**

0.66**

0.63**

0.6**

0.41**

0.81**

0.67**

0.67**

0.53**

0.61**

0.7**

0.7**

0.81**

0.63**
0.77**

0.77**

Note. Spearman rank correlations between all monetary and health decision-making from Experiment 3. DD: Delay Discounting. PD: Probability Discounting. S:
Small Magnitude. L: Large magnitude. +: Gain frame. -: Loss frame. Mi: Mild severity. Mo: Moderate severity. Se: Severe severity. H: Headache. C: Cough. N:
Nausea. Dashed lines separate monetary and health decision-making. *: p < .05. **: p < .01. Values above the diagonal are corrected from multiple comparisons
using the Holm-Bonferroni method.

Figure 1. Boxplot of Experiment 1 Monetary Discounting

Note. Boxplots of AUCord of delay and probability discounting. Boxes represent the middle 50%
of the distribution, white squares represent the mean, horizontal black lines represent the median.
Whiskers are 1.5 x IQR. Order for both delay and probability are by gains (small then large) and
losses (small then large). Higher values of delay AUCord indicate less impulsive decisionmaking, whereas higher values of probability AUCord indicate greater risky decision-making.
Magnitude and frame were significantly different for delay discounting, but only frame was
significant for probability discounting. There was no significant interaction between frame and
magnitude for either delay or probability discounting.
The results of Gilroy et al.’s (2017) model selection process for each condition in
Experiment 1 can be found in Table 3. For monetary discounting, the Rachlin model was heavily
favored over other models (35.8%–76.4% of data paths), with the noise model being the second
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most favored (14.5%–57.6%). For delay discounting, loss frames had a higher proportion of
noise models (i.e., straight lines). Figure 2 are line graphs of the median points for monetary
discounting.
Table 3. Experiment 1 Model Selection Results
% of Most Probable Model(n)
GreenVariable
Noise
Exponential Hyperbolic Myerson
Rachlin
DD S +
24.8(41) 13.3(22)
4.8(8)
4.8(8)
52.1(86)
DD L +
37.6(62) 7.9(13)
4.2(7)
2.4(4)
47.9(79)
DD S 51.5(85) 6.1(10)
4.2(7)
2.4(4)
35.8(59)
DD L 57.6(95) 4.2(7)
6.1(10)
2.4(4)
29.7(49)
PD S +
18.2(30) 2.4(4)
1.2(2)
1.8(3)
76.4(126)
PD L +
14.5(24) 4.2(7)
3.6(6)
1.8(3)
75.8(125)
PD S 21.2(35) 7.3(12)
6.7(11)
1.8(3)
63(104)
PD L 17(28)
7.9(13)
3(5)
3.6(6)
68.5(113)
Mi H
8.5(14)
9.7(16)
8.5(14)
16.4(27)
57(94)
Mo H
10.3(17) 11.5(19)
12.7(21)
13.9(23)
51.5(85)
Se H
11.5(19) 9.7(16)
10.9(18)
7.9(13)
60(99)
Mi C
10.3(17) 11.5(19)
12.1(20)
14.5(24)
51.5(85)
Mo C
6.7(11)
10.9(18)
15.2(25)
15.8(26)
51.5(85)
Se C
10.9(18) 13.3(22)
9.7(16)
8.5(14)
57.6(95)
Mi N
10.3(17) 10.9(18)
12.7(21)
13.3(22)
52.7(87)
Mo N
9.1(15)
9.7(16)
7.3(12)
13.3(22)
60.6(100)
Se N
14.5(24) 8.5(14)
10.3(17)
15.8(26)
50.9(84)
Total
19.7(552) 8.8(246)
7.8(220)
8.3(232)
55.4(1555)
Note. DD: Delay Discounting. PD: Probability Discounting. S: Small Magnitude.
L: Large magnitude. +: Gain frame. -: Loss frame. Mi: Mild severity. Mo:
Moderate severity. Se: Severe severity. H: Headache. C: Cough. N: Nausea.
Dashed line separates monetary discounting from medical decision-making.
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Figure 2. Line Graphs of Experiment 1 Monetary Discounting

Note. Line graphs of delay (left panel) and probability (right panel) discounting in Experiment 1.
Y-axis represents the likelihood a participant would choose the ‘better option’ (i.e., larger reward
or smaller loss) for both delay and probability discounting. Delays are in days and probabilities
are in percent chance of larger outcome. Note that percent chance is in descending rather than
ascending order to allow for comparisons with delay discounting.
The JB assessment of discounting can be found in Table 4 based on condition. Few data
paths for monetary discounting were identified as having bounce (1.2% – 10.3%), while more
were identified as not meeting the sensitivity criteria (13.9%–59.4%). The three highest
conditions for not meeting sensitivity criteria were the loss frames for delay discounting and the
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large magnitude for delay discounting. Generally, there was a low percentage of data paths that
failed both JB criteria (0.6%–8.5%) for monetary discounting.
Table 4. Experiment 1 Johnson & Bickel Criteria
% Failures(n)
Variable
Bounce
Sensitivity
Both
DD S +
2.4(4)
25.5(42)
1.2(2)
DD L +
1.2(2)
40.6(67)
0.6(1)
DD S 5.5(9)
52.1(86)
4.8(8)
DD L 4.8(8)
59.4(98)
4.8(8)
PD S +
6.7(11)
17(28)
4.8(8)
PD L +
7.3(12)
13.9(23)
4.8(8)
PD S 10.3(17)
20(33)
7.3(12)
PD L 10.3(17)
16.4(27)
8.5(14)
Mi H
3(5)
9.7(16)
3(5)
Mo H
3.6(6)
10.3(17)
3(5)
Se H
3(5)
13.9(23)
3(5)
Mi C
4.2(7)
12.7(21)
3(5)
Mo C
3(5)
7.9(13)
3(5)
Se C
3.6(6)
13.3(22)
2.4(4)
Mi N
4.8(8)
12.1(20)
4.8(8)
Mo N
3.6(6)
12.7(21)
3.6(6)
Se N
4.2(7)
18.2(30)
3(5)
Total
4.8(135)
20.9(587)
3.9(109)
Note. DD: Delay Discounting. PD: Probability
Discounting. S: Small Magnitude. L: Large
magnitude. +: Gain frame. -: Loss frame. Mi: Mild
severity. Mo: Moderate severity. Se: Severe severity.
H: Headache. C: Cough. N: Nausea. Dashed line
separates monetary discounting from medical
decision-making.

For delay discounting, only the SF-12 PCS was found to be statistically significant, V =
0.11, F(4, 147) = 4.41, p = .0022. For probability discounting, only ethnicity was found to be a
significant, V = 0.15, F(12, 447), p = 0.023. No other demographic variables were found to be
significantly associated with delay or probability discounting. Table 5 contains aggregated
parameter estimates from all regressions used in the MANOVA.
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Table 5. Experiment 1 Aggregated Relationships with Demographics
Condition
Variable
DD
PD
Cough Headache Nausea
Age
0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0022
-0.001 -0.0014
SES-2
-0.0354 0.0687 0.0436
0.063 -0.0206
SES-3
-0.1374
0.015 0.1013
0.1016
0.026
Gen-Male
0.0029 -0.0027
0.042
0.0715
0.0425
Eth-Asian
-0.0602 0.0457 0.0541
0.0072
0.0148
Eth-Hispanic/Latin
0.0234 -0.0101 -0.129
-0.097 -0.1487
Eth-Black/African
-0.2396 0.0441 0.1692
0.161
0.0698
Smoker
-0.0116 -0.019 -0.0093
0.0002 -0.0155
Insured
0.1067
0.01
0.028
0.052
0.079
Doctor Trust
-0.005 0.0004 0.0112
0.0071
0.008
SF12-PCS
0.0379 -0.0034 -0.0175
-0.017 -0.0079
SF12-MCS
-0.0139 0.0011 0.0115
0.0053
0.0013
Underlying Condition
0.0668 -0.0017 0.0074
-0.0267 -0.0322
Avoided/Delayed Healthcare
0.0491 -0.0284 0.0032
0.0029
0.0153
Note. Averaged parameter estimates from all linear regressions used in the
MANOVA. Bold: Overall factors that were identified as significant from the
MANOVA, not individual estimates. DD: Delay discounting. PD: Probability
discounting. Cough, Headache, Nausea: Overall medical decision-making for
respective symptom. Dashed line separates monetary discounting from medical
decision-making. Reference points for SES, gender, and ethnicity are SES-1,
female, and Caucasian respectively. SF-12 PCS: Physical Component Summary
scores. SF-12 MCS: Mental Component Summary Scores.

Health Decision-Making
Table 2 is a table of Spearmen correlations for all behavioral measures for Experiment 1.
Generally, responses to health-related questions were highly correlated with responses to other
health-related questions. That is, those that were more likely to seek a medical professional for
one symptom were likely to seek a medical professional for another. This pattern was consistent
for severities across symptom as well. While decision-making for health was most correlated
within a symptom rather than between, the as severity increased within a symptom, the
association with other severities of that symptom decreased. For medical decision-making,
severity, χ2(2) = 635.60, p < .0001, and symptom, χ2(2) = 93.66, p < .0001, were significant
factors. There was no significant interaction between the two, χ2(5) = 3.02, p = .5537. As
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symptom severity increased, likelihood of seeking a medical professional increased, while
seeking treatment for coughing was lowest, followed by headache, and finally nausea. Figure 3 is
a boxplot of AUCord of medical decision-making by symptom and severity.
Figure 3. Boxplot of Experiment 1 Health Decision-Making

Note. Boxplots of AUCord of health decision-making questions in Experiment 1. Boxes represent
the middle 50% of the distribution, white squares represent the mean, horizontal black lines
represent the median. Whiskers are 1.5 x IQR. Symptoms are ordered by cough, headache, and
nausea. Severity increases from left to right. Higher values of AUCord indicate increased
likelihood to seek healthcare. Symptom and severity were statistically significant factors, but
there was no significant interaction between them.
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Model selection for health decision-making can be found in Table 3. The Rachlin model
was favored in all cases (50.9%–60.6%), with fairly similar proportions between the other
models. JB criteria failures were generally low for bounce (3%–4.8%), sensitivity (7.9%–
18.2%), and both (2.4%–4.8%). As severity increased, JB failures of sensitivity also increased.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 are line graphs of health decision-making across duration a symptom was
experienced for cough, headaches, and nausea respectively. Experimental health decisionmaking JB failures can be found in Table 4
Figure 4. Line Graph of Experiment 1 Medical Decision-Making – Cough
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Note. Line graph of median medical decision-making for cough in Experiment 1. Y-axis is the
median likelihood of seeking a medical professional. X-axis is duration the symptom has
persisted in days.
Figure 5. Line Graph of Experiment 1 Medical Decision-Making – Headaches

Note. Line graph of median medical decision-making for headaches in Experiment 1. Y-axis is
the median likelihood of seeking a medical professional. X-axis is duration the symptom has
persisted in days.

53

Figure 6. Line Graph of Experiment 1 Medical Decision-Making – Nausea

Note. Line graph of median medical decision-making for nausea in Experiment 1. Y-axis is the
median likelihood of seeking a medical professional. X-axis is duration the symptom has
persisted in days.
Delay discounting for gains and losses was significantly related to most health decisionmaking scenarios, with an inverse relationship between seeking health treatment and monetary
discounting. That is, those who might be considered as “more impulsive” based on monetary
discounting were more likely to seek treatment earlier than those who were “less impulsive”
based on monetary discounting. There did not appear to be a clear relationship between sign of
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delay discounting and health decision-making. Riskiness (i.e., probability discounting) did not
seem to be related to health decision-making. After accounting for multiple comparisons, this
generally seemed to be consistent across magnitudes and gain/loss frames. A general trend that
occurred is that as severity increased, the strength of the relationship decreased. After correcting
for multiple comparisons, the associations between delay discounting and nausea were no longer
significant.
For demographic factors associated with medical decision-making, trust in doctors, V =
0.06, F(3, 148) = 3.12, p = .028, and SF-12 PCS, V = 0.07, F(3, 148) = 3.79, p = .012 were the
only significant factors for coughs. For headaches, only gender, V = .06, F(3, 148) = 3.08, p =
.029, was a significant factor. Lastly, gender, V = .05, F(3, 148) = 2.84, p = .04, and trust in
doctors, V = .07, F(3, 148) = 3.92, p = .01, were significantly factors for nausea. Aggregated
parameter estimates for Experiment 1 can be found in Table 5.
Discussion
Generally, results of previous discounting were replicated regarding gains and losses for
delayed and probabilistic outcomes. Loss frames decreased impulsivity and increased riskiness,
although the magnitude effect was not seen for probability discounting. For health decisionmaking, there was both a commodity specific effect between symptoms, and severities affect
decision-making in predictable ways. Impulsivity was related to seeking medical help, in that
those who were more impulsive (i.e., steeper discounters) were more likely to seek help sooner
based on duration of experienced symptom. Probability discounting was not related to either
delay discounting or medical decision-making. There were few associations with medical
decision-making and demographic variables, although gender, physical health, and trust in
doctors seem to be moderators of decision-making.
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Experiment 2
Methods
The second experiment was similar to the health decision-making section in Experiment
1, with the addition of an added cost ($10, $100, $1000) to accessing a healthcare professional
and the removal of monetary discounting questions. For example, a question was presented as
“You have been experiencing X Y for the past Z. It will cost you A to see a healthcare
professional. How likely are you to contact or see a healthcare professional for your
symptoms?”. In this example, X represents a severity (i.e., mild, moderate, severe), Y represents
a symptom (i.e., headache, nausea, cough) and A is a cost (i.e., $10, $100, $1000). Order of
symptoms were randomized, but severities and costs were always be presented in an ascending
order for that symptom. For example, if nausea is the first symptom randomly selected, cost at
$10 was assessed at increasing durations at increasing severities, then cost at $100 was assessed
at increasing durations and increasing severities, and finally cost at $1000 was assessed at
increasing durations and increasing severities. This resulted in a total of 90 discounting questions
for Experiment 2.
Results
Survey Duration and Screening
Following screening there were data from 146 participants that were deemed as being
usable (73.0%). Median time to survey completion was 16.39 minutes (min = 6.92, max =
239.93). Therefore, compensation based on median time to completion was $12.81/hr.
Demographics
Table 6 has the demographic results of Experiment 2. The average age of participants
was 39, 55% were male, most were Caucasian (76%), and the majority were employed outside of

56

MTurk (79.5%). Most participants had some form of health insurance (81.8%), and over half
avoided/delayed a medical procedure due to cost (56.2%).

Table 6. Experiment 2 Demographics
Age
Gender
Male
Female
Other

n/mean
39

%/SD
12.9

81
64
1

55.5
43.8
0.7

Ethnicity
Caucasian
111
Asian
14
Black/African
10
Hispanic/Latin
6
Other
5
Other Employment
No
30
Lost Employment
Yes
5
SES Bracket
1-Low
6
2-Medium
56
3-High
84
Health Insurance
Medicaid/Medicare
45
Insured
66
Family/Spouse
7
Uninsured
28
Lost Health Insurance
Yes
4
Smoker
Yes
33
SF-12
PCS
16.3
MCS
18
Delayed Healthcare
Yes
79
Avoided Healthcare
Yes
75
Either Avoided or Delayed
Yes
82
Underlying Conditions
Yes
36
Trust in Doctors
16.3
Note. For discrete variables, the number of
participants and percentage of sample are
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76
9.6
6.8
4.1
3.4
20.5
3.4
4.1
38.4
57.5
30.8
45.2
4.8
19.2
2.7
22.6
3.1
3.1
54.1
51.4
56.2
24.7
4.4

included. For continuous variables, mean and SD
are included. SF-12 maximum scores are 20 and
27 for PCS (Physical Component Summary) and
MCS (Multiple Component Summary)
respectively. Trust in doctors maximum score is
25. Both lost employment and healthcare refer to
losing either due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
SES strata were determined by combining income
and education into a composite score based on
Sheffer et al. (2017).

Health Decision-Making
Table 7 is a table of Spearmen correlations for all behavioral measures for Experiment 2.
Generally, health decision-making was strongly correlated. That is, those that were more likely
to seek a medical professional for one symptom were likely to seek a medical professional for
another. This pattern was consistent for severities across symptom as well. While decisionmaking for health was most correlated within a symptom rather than between, the as severity
increased within a symptom, the association with other severities of that symptom decreased.
Decision-making based on costs were also correlated, where similar costs for accessing
healthcare were more correlated than for different costs. For medical decision-making, severity,
χ2(1) = 722.36, p < .0001, symptom, χ2(2) = 87.79, p < .0001, and cost, χ2(2) = 1099.65, p <
.0001, significant factors. There was a significant interaction between severity and cost, χ2(2) =
10.38, p = .0056, and between symptom and cost, χ2(4) = 10.99, p = .0267. There was no
significant interaction between severity and symptom, χ2(2) = 2.25, p = .3239, or all three
factors, χ2(4) = 1.83, p = .7667. As symptom severity increased, likelihood of seeking a medical
professional increased, while seeking treatment for coughing was lowest, followed by headache,
and finally nausea. As cost increased, seeking a medical professional decreased. Figure 7 shows
a box plot of AUCord values by symptom, severity, and cost. Figure 8 shows interaction plots for
symptom by cost, severity by cost, severity by symptom, and symptom by severity.
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Table 7. Correlation Matrix of Behavioral Measures Based on AUCords from Experiment 2
Variable

1

1. Mi H 10
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2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

0.62**

0.65**

0.57**

0.49**

0.41**

0.44**

0.52**

0.5**

0.47**

0.47**

0.45**

0.46**

0.3**

0.53**

0.46**

0.46**

0.37**

0.41**

0.67**

0.18

0.44**

0.28*

0.55**

0.28*

0.44**

0.14

0.3**

0.43**

0.55**

0.31**

0.48**

0.17

0.25*

0.74**

0.78**

0.69**

0.53**

0.49**

0.72**

0.66**

0.7**

0.68**

0.32**

0.16

0.72**

0.49**

0.71**

0.62**

0.55**

0.76**

0.35**

0.62**

0.58**

0.74**

0.46**

0.66**

0.36**

0.39**

0.57**

0.62**

0.46**

0.61**

0.69**

0.49**

0.33**

0.69**

0.57**

0.81**

0.74**

0.27*

0.06

0.63**

0.33**

0.8**

0.7**

0.3**

0.44**

0.59**

0.7**

0.59**

0.78**

0.3**

0.22

0.57**

0.57**

0.64**

0.82**

0.64**

0.64**

0.51**

0.53**

0.45**

0.25*

0.1

0.4**

0.22

0.47**

0.34**

0.48**

0.65**

0.3**

0.45**

0.38**

0.36**

0.42**

0.44**

0.3**

0.38**

0.76**

0.83**

0.77**

0.37**

0.18

0.62**

0.4**

0.69**

0.63**

0.64**

0.8**

0.34**

0.31**

0.56**

0.5**

0.52**

0.66**

0.79**

0.2

-0.04

0.57**

0.26*

0.79**

0.67**

0.31**

0.18

0.64**

0.47**

0.73**

0.8**

0.68**

0.6**

0.56**

0.31**

0.28*

0.36**

0.63**

0.05

0.19

0.67**

0.71**

0.65**

0.39**

0.58**

2. Se H 10

0.62**

3. Mi H 100

0.65**

0.41**

4. Se H 100

0.57**

0.67**

0.74**

5. Mi H 1k

0.49**

0.18*

0.78**

0.55**

6. Se H 1k

0.41**

0.44**

0.69**

0.76**

0.69**

7. Mi C 10

0.44**

0.28**

0.53**

0.35**

0.49**

0.3**

8. Se C 10

0.52**

0.55**

0.49**

0.62**

0.33**

0.44**

0.64**

9. Mi C 100

0.5**

0.28**

0.72**

0.58**

0.69**

0.59**

0.64**

0.48**

10. Se C 100

0.47**

0.44**

0.66**

0.74**

0.57**

0.7**

0.51**

0.65**

0.76**

11. Mi C 1k

0.47**

0.14

0.7**

0.46**

0.81**

0.59**

0.53**

0.3**

0.83**

0.64**

12. Se C 1k

0.45**

0.3**

0.68**

0.66**

0.74**

0.78**

0.45**

0.45**

0.77**

0.8**

0.79**

13. Mi N 10

0.46**

0.43**

0.32**

0.36**

0.27**

0.3**

0.25**

0.38**

0.37**

0.34**

0.2*

14. Se N 10

0.3**

0.55**

0.16

0.39**

0.06

0.22**

0.1

0.36**

0.18*

0.31**

-0.04

0.18*

0.68**

15. Mi N 100

0.53**

0.31**

0.72**

0.57**

0.63**

0.57**

0.4**

0.42**

0.62**

0.56**

0.57**

0.64**

0.6**

0.36**

16. Se N 100

0.46**

0.48**

0.49**

0.62**

0.33**

0.57**

0.22**

0.44**

0.4**

0.5**

0.26**

0.47**

0.56**

0.63**

0.67**

17. Mi N 1k

0.46**

0.17*

0.71**

0.46**

0.8**

0.64**

0.47**

0.3**

0.69**

0.52**

0.79**

0.73**

0.31**

0.05

0.71**

0.39**

18. Se N 1k

0.37**

0.25**

0.62**

0.61**

0.7**

0.82**

0.34**

0.38**

0.63**

0.66**

0.67**

0.8**

0.28**

0.19*

0.65**

0.58**

0.31**

0.76**
0.76**

Note. Spearman rank correlations between all monetary and health decision-making from Experiment 3. Mi: Mild severity. Se: Severe severity. H: Headache. C:
Cough. N: Nausea. 10: $10 cost for accessing healthcare. 100: $100 cost for accessing healthcare. 1k: $1,000 cost for accessing healthcare. *: p < .05. **: p <
.01. Values above the diagonal are corrected from multiple comparisons using the Holm-Bonferroni method.

Figure 7. Boxplot of Experiment 2 Medical Decision-Making

Note. Boxplots of AUCord of health decision-making questions in Experiment 2. Boxes represent
the middle 50% of the distribution, white squares represent the mean, horizontal black lines
represent the median. Whiskers are 1.5 x IQR. Symptoms are ordered by cough, headache, and
nausea. Dotted line separates mild (left) from severe (right) symptoms. Higher AUCord indicate
higher likelihood of seeking healthcare. Symptom, severity, and cost were all significant factors.
There were significant interactions between cost and symptom and cost and severity.
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Figure 8. Experiment 2 Interaction Plots

Note. Interaction plots for Experiment 2 health decision-making. Y-axes are mean AUCord. Top
left panel shows the interaction between symptom and cost of accessing healthcare, top right
showing the interaction between severity and cost of accessing healthcare.
Model selection for health decision-making can be found in Table 8. The Rachlin model
was generally favored (43.9% of all medical decision-making), with the GM model and noise
models as 18.6% and 16.9% of probable models for medical decision-making respectively.
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Table 8. Experiment 2 Model Selection Results
% of Most Probable Model(n)
GreenVariable
Noise
Exponential Hyperbolic Myerson
Rachlin
Mi H 10
15.1(22) 13(19)
9.6(14)
17.8(26)
44.5(65)
Se H 10
14.4(21) 8.9(13)
11.6(17)
12.3(18)
52.7(77)
Mi H 100
12.3(18) 8.9(13)
10.3(15)
24.7(36)
43.8(64)
Se H 100
11.6(17) 8.9(13)
11.6(17)
19.9(29)
47.9(70)
Mi H 1k
32.2(47) 8.9(13)
6.8(10)
17.1(25)
34.9(51)
Se H 1k
13.7(20) 11(16)
13(19)
23.3(34)
39(57)
Mi C 10
18.5(27) 9.6(14)
10.3(15)
15.1(22)
46.6(68)
Se C 10
13.7(20) 13(19)
15.8(23)
14.4(21)
43.2(63)
Mi C 100
17.1(25) 5.5(8)
11(16)
17.1(25)
49.3(72)
Se C 100
11.6(17) 11(16)
17.8(26)
15.8(23)
43.8(64)
Mi C 1k
34.9(51) 2.1(3)
4.1(6)
23.3(34)
35.6(52)
Se C 1k
14.4(21) 4.1(6)
12.3(18)
24(35)
45.2(66)
Mi N 10
12.3(18) 11(16)
16.4(24)
13(19)
47.3(69)
Se N 10
16.4(24) 13.7(20)
12.3(18)
13(19)
44.5(65)
Mi C 100
11.6(17) 12.3(18)
4.8(7)
16.4(24)
54.8(80)
Se C 100
12.3(18) 9.6(14)
15.1(22)
13(19)
50(73)
Mi C 1k
27.4(40) 6.8(10)
10.3(15)
26(38)
29.5(43)
Se C 1k
14.4(21) 4.8(7)
15.1(22)
28.1(41)
37.7(55)
Total
16.9(444) 9.1(238)
11.6(304)
18.6(488) 43.9(1154)
Note. Mi: Mild severity. Se: Severe severity. H: Headache. C: Cough. N:
Nausea. 10: $10 cost for accessing healthcare. 100: $100 cost for accessing
healthcare. 1k: $1,000 cost for accessing healthcare.

JB criteria failures were generally low for bounce (4.1–8.2%), although higher for
sensitivity (13.0–38.4%). There were 4.7% of data paths that failed both bounce and sensitivity
criteria in Experiment 2. Table 9 contains the result of the JB criteria assessments for Experiment
2. As cost increased, JB failures of sensitivity also increased. Figures 9, 10, and 11 are line
graphs of median health decision-making for cough, headaches, and nausea respectively.
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Table 9. Experiment 2 Johnson & Bickel Criteria
% Failures(n)
Variable
Bounce
Sensitivity
Both
Mi H 10
5.5(8)
13.7(20)
3.4(5)
Se H 10
5.5(8)
14.4(21)
4.8(7)
Mi H 100
6.8(10)
13(19)
4.8(7)
Se H 100
4.8(7)
13(19)
3.4(5)
Mi H 1k
5.5(8)
38.4(56)
4.1(6)
Se H 1k
6.2(9)
16.4(24)
6.2(9)
Mi C 10
8.2(12)
21.2(31)
7.5(11)
Se C 10
4.1(6)
17.1(25)
4.1(6)
Mi C 100
4.8(7)
17.8(26)
4.8(7)
Se C 100
5.5(8)
11.6(17)
3.4(5)
Mi C 1k
4.8(7)
38.4(56)
4.1(6)
Se C 1k
4.8(7)
17.1(25)
4.8(7)
Mi N 10
6.8(10)
12.3(18)
6.2(9)
Se N 10
6.8(10)
17.1(25)
5.5(8)
Mi C 100
6.2(9)
11.6(17)
4.1(6)
Se C 100
5.5(8)
12.3(18)
4.1(6)
Mi C 1k
6.2(9)
30.8(45)
4.1(6)
Se C 1k
5.5(8)
14.4(21)
4.8(7)
Total
5.8(151)
18.4(483)
4.7(123)
Note. Mi: Mild severity. Se: Severe severity. H:
Headache. C: Cough. N: Nausea. 10: $10 cost for
accessing healthcare. 100: $100 cost for accessing
healthcare. 1k: $1,000 cost for accessing healthcare.
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Figure 9. Line Graphs of Experiment 2 Medical Decision-Making – Cough

Note. Line graph of median medical decision-making for cough in Experiment 2. Y-axis is the
median likelihood of seeking a medical professional. X-axis is duration the symptom has
persisted in days. Left panel shows the effect of cost to access healthcare for mild cough,
whereas the right panel shows the effect of cost on severe cough.
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Figure 10. Line Graphs of Experiment 2 Medical Decision-Making – Headaches

Note. Line graph of median medical decision-making for headaches in Experiment 2. Y-axis is
the median likelihood of seeking a medical professional. X-axis is duration the symptom has
persisted in days. Left panel shows the effect of cost to access healthcare for mild headaches,
whereas the right panel shows the effect of cost on severe headaches.
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Figure 11. Line Graphs of Experiment 2 Medical Decision-Making – Nausea

Note. Line graph of median medical decision-making for nausea in Experiment 2. Y-axis is the
median likelihood of seeking a medical professional. X-axis is duration the symptom has
persisted in days. Left panel shows the effect of cost to access healthcare for mild nausea,
whereas the right panel shows the effect of cost on severe nausea.
Results of the aggregated MANOVAs from Experiment 2 can be found in Table 10. For
coughing, age, V = .22, F(6, 124) = 5.98, p < .0001, SF-12 PCS, V = .16, F(6, 124) = 4.06, p <
.0001, and avoided/delayed healthcare due to cost, V = .12, F(6, 124) = 2.82, p = .0132, were
significant factors. For headaches, age, V = .21, F(6, 124) = 5.33, p < .0001, SF-12 PCS, V = .17,
F(6, 124) = 4.11, p = .0009, and avoided/delayed healthcare due to cost, V = .16, F(6, 124) =
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3.85, p = .0015, were significant factors. Lastly, SF-12 PCS, V = .22, F(6,124) = 5.72, p < .0001,
having an underlying condition, V = .11, F(6, 124) = 2.64, p = .0193, and having
avoided/delayed healthcare due to cost, V = .14, F(6, 124) = 3.44, p = .0036, were significant
factors for nausea.

Table 10. Experiment 2 Aggregated Relationships with
Demographics
Condition
Variable
Cough Headache Nausea
Age
-0.0007
0.0002 -0.0003
SES-2
-0.0794
-0.0292 -0.0133
SES-3
-0.0611
0.0074 -0.0019
Gen-Male
0.0661
0.1063 0.0341
Gen-Other
-0.1245
-0.0454 -0.1452
Eth-Asian
0.0221
-0.0287 -0.0173
Eth-Hispanic/Latin
0.0376
0.0631 0.0357
Eth-Black/African
0.0166
0.0205 0.1437
Eth-Other
0.0537
0.0136 0.0063
Smoker
0.0092
0.0211 0.0202
Insured
-0.0164
-0.0304
0.004
Doctor Trust
0.0062
-0.0005 -0.0023
SF12-PCS
-0.0239
-0.0159 -0.0144
SF12-MCS
0.0061
0.0117 0.0056
Underlying Condition
0.0058
0.009 -0.0322
Avoided/Delayed Healthcare
-0.0933
-0.089 -0.0894
Note. Averaged parameter estimates from all linear regressions
used in the MANOVA. Bold: Overall factors that were
identified as significant from the MANOVA, not individual
estimates. DD: Delay discounting. PD: Probability discounting.
Cough, Headache, Nausea: Overall medical decision-making
for respective symptom. Reference points for SES, gender, and
ethnicity are SES-1, female, and Caucasian respectively. SF-12
PCS: Physical Component Summary scores. SF-12 MCS:
Mental Component Summary Scores.

Discussion
Health decision-making was affected by cost and severity in expected ways. These results
were similar to Experiment 1, in that increased symptom severity increased seeking a healthcare
professional. Increased cost of healthcare decreased seeking a healthcare professional. Within
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costs and symptoms, decision-making was correlated. In this sample, age was related to
treatment seeking for cough and nausea, whereas there was an inverse relationship between
physical health and treatment seeking for all symptoms. Having reported avoiding or delaying
seeing a doctor due to cost decreased likelihood of seeking treatment.
Experiment 3
Methods
The third experiment combined the first and second experiments such that delay and
probability discounting, framing (i.e., gaining money or losing money), symptom, severity, and
cost of healthcare utilization were assessed. Monetary discounting was assessed in the same way
as Experiment 1, but only the smaller monetary magnitudes were used ($500 and $1,000). This
reduced the number of monetary discounting questions from 40 to 20. All three symptoms were
used, but only mild and severe severities and costs of $10 and $1,000 were assessed. Order of
symptoms was randomly presented, but severities and costs were always in ascending order
much like in Experiment 2. Therefore, there were 60 health discounting questions, for a total for
80 discounting questions in Experiment 3.
Results
Survey Duration and Screening
Following screening there were data from 158 participants that were deemed as being
usable (78.0%). Median time to survey completion was 17.85 minutes (min = 5.90, max =
210.97). Therefore, compensation based on median time to completion was $11.76/hr.
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Demographics
The demographic results of Experiment 3 are in Table 11. Most participants identified as
being Caucasian (79.5%), male (60.9%), and having work outside of MTurk (75.6%). Mean age
was 37.3, and nearly all participants had some form of health insurance coverage (92.3%).

Table 11. Experiment 3 Demographics
n/mean
37.3

%/SD
10.2

Male
Female
Other

95
60
1

60.9
38.5
0.6

Caucasian
Asian
Black/African
Hispanic/Latin
Other
Other Employment
No
Lost Employment
Yes
SES Bracket
1-Low
2-Medium
3-High
Health Insurance
Medicaid/Medicare
Insured
Family/Spouse
Uninsured
Lost Health Insurance
Yes
Smoker
Yes
SF-12
PCS
MCS
Delayed Healthcare
Yes
Avoided Healthcare
Yes
Either Avoided or Delayed
Yes
Underlying Conditions

124
3
13
13
3

79.5
1.9
8.3
8.3
1.9

38

24.4

6

3.8

3
59
94

1.9
37.8
60.3

46
77
12
21

29.5
49.4
13.5
7.7

2

1.3

29

18.6

16.3
18

3
3.2

83

53.3

73

46.8

88

56.4

Age
Gender

Ethnicity
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Yes
32
20.5
Trust in Doctors
17
4
Note. For discrete variables, the number of
participants and percentage of sample are
included. For continuous variables, mean and SD
are included. SF-12 maximum scores are 20 and
27 for PCS (Physical Component Summary) and
MCS (Multiple Component Summary)
respectively. Trust in doctors maximum score is
25. Both lost employment and healthcare refer to
losing either due to the COVID-19 pandemic. SES
strata were determined by combining income and
education into a composite score based on Sheffer
et al. (2017).

Monetary Discounting
Table 12 is correlation matrix of Spearman correlations of all behavioral outcomes (i.e.,
monetary discounting and health decision-making) calculated by AUCord in Experiment 3. Delay
discounting measures were generally strongly correlated with each other, while not strongly
correlated with probability discounting measures. Probability discounting of gains and losses
were not correlated in this sample. There were some small correlations between delay
discounting of gains and probability discounting of gains, but after corrections for multiple
comparisons there were no significant associations between probability and delay discounting.
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Table 12. Correlation Matrix of Behavioral Measures Based on AUCords from Experiment 3
Variable

1

1. DD S +
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2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

0.53**

0.23

0.1

-0.06

0.05

-0.24

-0.17

-0.22

-0.11

-0.27*

-0.27*

-0.05

0.05

-0.23

-0.11

-0.05

0.21

-0.15

-0.01

-0.32**

-0.24

-0.29*

-0.19

-0.34**

-0.34**

-0.04

0.05

-0.24

-0.17

-0.11

0.01

-0.03

0.05

0.07

0.15

0.05

0.18

0.15

-0.05

-0.03

0.06

0.07

0.05

0.09

-0.06

-0.06

-0.12

-0.05

-0.12

-0.14

-0.01

0.04

-0.13

-0.11

0.63**

0.52**

0.48**

0.44**

0.44**

0.32**

0.36**

0.43**

0.4**

0.4**

0.35**

0.25

0.41**

0.28*

0.53**

0.13

0.27*

0.46**

0.62**

0.19

0.31**

0.77**

0.47**

0.29*

0.75**

0.78**

0.31**

0.14

0.76**

0.65**

0.35**

0.42**

0.63**

0.78**

0.32**

0.24

0.7**

0.7**

0.68**

0.62**

0.55**

0.44**

0.27*

0.43**

0.38**

0.41**

0.49**

0.43**

0.45**

0.25

0.32**

0.84**

0.27*

0.03

0.72**

0.61**

0.15

0.75**

0.74**

0.72**

0.39**

0.44**

0.18

0.37**

2. DD S -

0.53**

3. PD S +

0.23**

-0.05

4. PD S -

0.1

0.21**

5. Mi H 10

-0.06

-0.15

0.01

0.05

6. Se H 10

0.05

-0.01

-0.03

0.09

0.63**

7. Mi H 1k

-0.24**

-0.32**

0.05

-0.06

0.52**

0.25**

8. Se H 1k

-0.17*

-0.24**

0.07

-0.06

0.48**

0.41**

0.77**

9. Mi C 10

-0.22**

-0.29**

0.15

-0.12

0.44**

0.28**

0.47**

0.35**

-0.11

10. Se C 10

-0.11

-0.19*

0.05

-0.05

0.44**

0.53**

0.29**

0.42**

0.68**

11. Mi C 1k

-0.27**

-0.34**

0.18*

-0.12

0.32**

0.13

0.75**

0.63**

0.62**

0.41**

12. Se C 1k

-0.27**

-0.34**

0.15

-0.14

0.36**

0.27**

0.78**

0.78**

0.55**

0.49**

0.84**

13. Mi N 10

-0.05

-0.04

-0.05

-0.01

0.43**

0.46**

0.31**

0.32**

0.44**

0.43**

0.27**

0.28*
0.28**

14. Se N 10

0.05

0.05

-0.03

0.04

0.4**

0.62**

0.14

0.24**

0.27**

0.45**

0.03

0.15

0.72**

15. Mi N 1k

-0.23**

-0.24**

0.06

-0.13

0.4**

0.19*

0.76**

0.7**

0.43**

0.25**

0.72**

0.75**

0.39**

0.18*

16. Se N 1k

-0.11

-0.17*

0.07

-0.11

0.35**

0.31**

0.65**

0.7**

0.38**

0.32**

0.61**

0.74**

0.44**

0.37**

0.79**
0.79**

Note. Spearman rank correlations between all monetary and health decision-making from Experiment 3. DD: Delay Discounting. PD: Probability
Discounting. S: Small Magnitude. +: Gain frame. -: Loss frame. Mi: Mild severity. Se: Severe severity. H: Headache. C: Cough. N: Nausea. 10: $10 cost for
accessing healthcare. 1k: $1,000 cost for accessing healthcare. Dashed lines separate monetary and health decision-making. *: p < .05. **: p < .01. Values
above the diagonal are corrected from multiple comparisons using the Holm-Bonferroni method.

For delay discounting, there was a significant difference for the loss frame, χ2(1) = 31.23
p < .0001. Loss decreased discounting for delayed outcomes. For probability discounting, the
loss frame was significant, χ2(1) = 74.45, p < .0001. Much like for delay discounting, the loss
frame increased AUCord of probability discounting (i.e., decreased discounting). Figure 12 is a
boxplot of AUCord of monetary discounting for Experiment 3.
Figure 12. Boxplot of Experiment 3 Monetary Discounting

Note. Boxplots of AUCord of delay and probability discounting for Experiment 3. Boxes
represent the middle 50% of the distribution, white squares represent the mean, horizontal black
lines represent the median. Whiskers are 1.5 x IQR. Order for both delay and probability are by
gains followed by losses. Higher values of delay AUCord indicate less impulsive decision72

making, whereas higher values of probability AUCord indicate greater risky decision-making.
Frame was a statistically significant factor for delay and probability discounting.
The results of Gilroy et al.’s (2017) model selection process for each condition in
Experiment 3 can be found in Table 13. For monetary discounting, the Rachlin model was
heavily favored over other models (34.6%–74.2% of data paths), with the noise model being the
second most favored (16.4%–49.7%). For delay discounting, the loss frame resulted in higher
proportion of noise models (i.e., straight lines). Figure 13 are line graphs of the median
indifference points for monetary discounting for Experiment 3.

Table 13. Experiment 3 Model Selection Results
% of Most Probable Model(n)
GreenVariable
Noise
Exponential Hyperbolic Myerson
Rachlin
DD S +
24.5(39) 8.2(13)
7.5(12)
3.1(5)
56.6(90)
DD S 49.7(79) 6.3(10)
4.4(7)
5(8)
34.6(55)
PD S +
16.4(26) 6.3(10)
1.9(3)
1.3(2)
74.2(118)
PD S 23.9(38) 5.7(9)
2.5(4)
1.9(3)
66(105)
Mi H 10
20.8(33) 11.9(19)
8.2(13)
5(8)
54.1(86)
Se H 10
31.4(50) 8.2(13)
9.4(15)
6.3(10)
44.7(71)
Mi H 1k
28.3(45) 8.8(14)
8.8(14)
15.1(24)
39(62)
Se H 1k
20.8(33) 6.9(11)
12.6(20)
14.5(23)
45.3(72)
Mi C 10
21.4(34) 11.3(18)
9.4(15)
6.3(10)
51.6(82)
Se C 10
22.6(36) 10.1(16)
5.7(9)
7.5(12)
54.1(86)
Mi C 1k
32.1(51) 6.3(10)
9.4(15)
11.9(19)
40.3(64)
Se C 1k
20.1(32) 9.4(15)
7.5(12)
20.1(32)
42.8(68)
Mi N 10
25.8(41) 8.8(14)
6.9(11)
10.1(16)
48.4(77)
Se N 10
23.9(38) 8.2(13)
9.4(15)
10.1(16)
48.4(77)
Mi N 1k
26.4(42) 6.9(11)
11.3(18)
19.5(31)
35.8(57)
Se N 1k
19.5(31) 8.2(13)
6.9(11)
22.6(36)
42.8(68)
Total
25.5(648) 8.2(209)
7.6(194)
10(255)
48.7(1238)
Note. DD: Delay Discounting. PD: Probability Discounting. S: Small
Magnitude. +: Gain frame. -: Loss frame. Mi: Mild severity. Se: Severe
severity. H: Headache. C: Cough. N: Nausea. 10: $10 cost for accessing
healthcare. 1k: $1,000 cost for accessing healthcare. Dashed line separates
monetary discounting from health decision-making.
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Figure 13. Line Graphs of Experiment 3 Monetary Discounting

Note. Line graphs of delay (left panel) and probability (right panel) discounting in Experiment 3.
Y-axis represents the likelihood a participant would choose the ‘better option’ (i.e., larger reward
or smaller loss) for delay and probability discounting. Delays are in days and probabilities are in
percent chance of larger reward. Note that percent chance is in descending rather than ascending
order to allow for comparisons with delay discounting.
The JB assessment of discounting can be found in Table 14 based on condition. Some
data paths for monetary discounting were identified as having bounce (6.9% – 16.4%), while
more were identified as not meeting the sensitivity criteria (17.0%–51.6%). Much like in
Experiment 1, the loss frame had the highest failures of sensitivity. Generally, there was a low
percentage of data paths that failed both JB criteria (5.0%–11.9%) for monetary discounting.
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Table 14. Experiment 3 Johnson & Bickel Criteria
% Failures(n)
Variable
Bounce
Sensitivity
Both
DD S +
6.9(11)
25.2(40)
5(8)
DD S 8.8(14)
51.6(82)
7.5(12)
PD S +
7.5(12)
17(27)
6.9(11)
PD S 16.4(26)
21.4(34)
11.9(19)
Mi H 10
13.2(21)
22(35)
11.9(19)
Se H 10
11.3(18)
30.2(48)
10.7(17)
Mi H 1k
10.7(17)
29.6(47)
6.3(10)
Se H 1k
8.2(13)
22(35)
6.9(11)
Mi C 10
10.7(17)
21.4(34)
6.9(11)
Se C 10
11.9(19)
22.6(36)
10.1(16)
Mi C 1k
9.4(15)
35.8(57)
8.8(14)
Se C 1k
8.8(14)
20.1(32)
6.9(11)
Mi N 10
11.9(19)
24.5(39)
10.7(17)
Se N 10
8.2(13)
22(35)
6.9(11)
Mi N 1k
7.5(12)
28.3(45)
5(8)
Se N 1k
9.4(15)
22(35)
8.8(14)
Total
10.1(256)
26(661)
8.2(209)
Note. DD: Delay Discounting. PD: Probability
Discounting. S: Small Magnitude. +: Gain frame. -:
Loss frame. Mi: Mild severity. Se: Severe severity. H:
Headache. C: Cough. N: Nausea. 10: $10 cost for
accessing healthcare. 1k: $1,000 cost for accessing
healthcare. Dashed line separates monetary discounting
from medical decision-making.

For delay discounting, only the SF-12 PCS was a significant factor, V = .12, F(2, 138) =
9.24, p = .0002. There were no significant demographic factors for probability discounting. Table
15 has the aggregated estimated for monetary discounting and health decision-making.

Table 15. Experiment 3 Aggregated Relationships with Demographics
Variable
Age
SES-2
SES-3
Gen-Male
Gen-Other
Eth-Asian
Eth-Hispanic/Latin
Eth-Black/African

DD
0.0028
0.001
-0.028
0.0256
-0.2146
0.1839
-0.0091
-0.1718

PD
-0.0012
-0.076
-0.098
0.0312
-0.3357
0.024
0.0363
0.007
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Condition
Cough Headache
-0.0011
-0.0019
0.2841
0.2153
0.3309
0.2334
0.0311
-0.0139
-0.0275
0.123
0.0825
0.0295
0.0846
0.0736
0.0821
0.0285

Nausea
0.0006
0.2179
0.273
-0.04
0.2231
0.0163
0.0579
0.0893

Eth-Other
0.0086 -0.0041 0.1253
-0.1045
0.05
Smoker
-0.0294 0.0516 0.0532
0.0598
0.0591
Insured
-0.0193 -0.0135 0.0421
0.0425 -0.0001
Doctor Trust
-0.0073 -0.0019 0.0024
0.0039
0.0007
SF12-PCS
0.0401
0.002 -0.0235
-0.01 -0.0093
SF12-MCS
-0.0027 -0.0017 0.0015
0.0035
0.0061
Underlying Condition
0.0745
0.005 -0.0008
-0.0076 -0.0084
Avoided/Delayed Healthcare
0.0314 0.0052 -0.0591
-0.0401 -0.0445
Note. Averaged parameter estimates from all linear regressions used in the
MANOVA. Bold: Overall factors that were identified as significant from the
MANOVA, not individual estimates. DD: Delay discounting. PD: Probability
discounting. Cough, Headache, Nausea: Overall medical decision-making for
respective symptom. Dashed line separates monetary discounting from medical
decision-making. Reference points for SES, gender, and ethnicity are SES-1,
female, and Caucasian respectively. SF-12 PCS: Physical Component Summary
scores. SF-12 MCS: Mental Component Summary Scores.

Health Decision-Making
Table 12 is a table of Spearmen correlations for all behavioral measures for Experiment
3. Generally, health decision-making was correlated. That is, those that were more likely to seek
a medical professional for one symptom were likely to seek a medical professional for another.
This pattern was consistent for severities across symptom as well. While decision-making for
health was most correlated within a symptom rather than between, the as severity increased
within a symptom, the association with other severities of that symptom decreased. This pattern
was also true for cost, much like in Experiment 2. For medical decision-making, severity, χ2(1) =
259.78, p < .0001, and symptom, χ2(2) = 30.16, p < .0001, and cost, χ2(1) = 550.36, p < .0001,
were significant factors. There was no significant interaction between the any combination or all
three of the factors. As symptom severity increased, likelihood of seeking a medical professional
increased, while seeking treatment for coughing was lowest, followed by headache, and finally
nausea. Figure 14 is a boxplot of AUCord for health decision-making in Experiment 3.

76

Figure 14. Boxplot of Experiment 3 Medical Decision-Making

Note. Boxplots of AUCord of health decision-making questions in Experiment 3. Boxes represent
the middle 50% of the distribution, white squares represent the mean, horizontal black lines
represent the median. Whiskers are 1.5 x IQR. Symptoms are ordered by cough, headache, and
nausea. Dotted line separates mild (left) from severe (right) symptoms. Severity, cost, and
symptom were all statistically significant factors. There was no significant interaction between
an factors.
Model selection for health decision-making can be found in Table 13. The Rachlin model
was favored in most cases (35.8%–54.1%) followed by the noise model (6.3%–32.1%), with
fairly similar proportions between the other models. JB criteria failures were slightly higher than
the other two experiments (7.5%–13.2%), sensitivity (20.1%–35.8%), and both (5.0%–11.9%).
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As severity increased, JB failures of sensitivity also increased. Results of the JB criteria can be
found in Table 14. Figures 15, 16, and 17 are line graphs of median indifference points for health
decision-making for cough, headache, and nausea respectively.
Figure 15. Line Graphs of Experiment 3 Medical Decision-Making – Cough

Note. Line graph of median medical decision-making for cough in Experiment 3. Y-axis is the
median likelihood of seeking a medical professional. X-axis is duration the symptom has
persisted in days. Left panel shows the effect of cost to access healthcare for mild cough,
whereas the right panel shows the effect of cost on severe cough.
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Figure 16. Line Graphs of Experiment 3 Medical Decision-Making – Headaches

Note. Line graph of median medical decision-making for headaches in Experiment 3. Y-axis is
the median likelihood of seeking a medical professional. X-axis is duration the symptom has
persisted in days. Left panel shows the effect of cost to access healthcare for mild headaches,
whereas the right panel shows the effect of cost on severe headaches.
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Figure 17. Line Graphs of Experiment 3 Medical Decision-Making – Nausea

Note. Line graph of median medical decision-making for nausea in Experiment 3. Y-axis is the
median likelihood of seeking a medical professional. X-axis is duration the symptom has
persisted in days. Left panel shows the effect of cost to access healthcare for mild nausea,
whereas the right panel shows the effect of cost on severe nausea.
Delay discounting for gains and losses was significantly related to most health decisionmaking scenarios, with an inverse relationship between seeking health treatment and monetary
discounting. That is, those who might be considered as “more impulsive” based on monetary
discounting were more likely to seek treatment earlier than those who were “less impulsive”
based on monetary discounting. Riskiness (i.e., probability discounting) did not seem to be
80

related to health decision-making. These are the same pattern of results from Experiment 1 with
regard to the relationship between monetary discounting and health decision-making. Generally,
delay discounting of losses was more associated with medical decision-making. Also like in
Experiment 1, delay discounting was less associated with nausea than other symptoms.
For cough, the SF-12 PCS, V = .16, F(4, 136) = 6.62, p < .0001, and having
avoided/delayed healthcare due to cost, V = .13, F(4, 136) = 5.21, p = .0006, were significant
factors. For headaches, SF-12 PCS, V = .08, F(4, 136) = 2.85, p = .0264, and avoided/delayed
healthcare due to cost, V = .11, F(4, 136) = 4.06, p = .0038, were significant factors. Lastly, age,
V = .07, F(4, 136) = 2.73, p = .0315, SF-12 PCS, V = 0.16, F(4, 136) = 6.71, p < .0001, and
having avoided/delayed healthcare due to cost, V = .13, F(4, 136) = 5, p = .0009, were significant
factors for nausea. Table 15 contains the aggregated estimates of linear regressions from
Experiment 3.
Discussion
Results of Experiment 3 were similar to those of Experiments 1 and 2. Monetary
discounting displayed the expected effects of gain and loss, while delay and probability were not
related to each other. Health decision-making followed the same pattern as Experiment 2, with
cost suppressing seeking a medical professional and severity increasing seeking a medical
professional. For relationships with demographic variables, physical health had an inverse
relationship with seeking a healthcare professional and previously avoiding/delaying seeing a
doctor due to cost decreased medical decision-making. These are similar to the results of
Experiment 2.
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Predicting Healthcare Seeking
Because the Rachlin model was favored most often against other models, it was used to
determine the effective duration of symptoms for when someone is at least 50% likely to seek
healthcare (EDur50). This was accomplished used the nls package in R and using the formula
(1/k)1/s proposed by Franck et al. (2015) to calculate ED50 derived from the Rachlin model.
EDur50 can be interpreted as the number of days a symptom has been occurring based on
associated severity and cost before an individual is likely to seek healthcare for that experienced
symptom. EDur50 was calculated on the median data from each health decision-making scenario
across all three experiments as a proof of concept. Table 16 contains the EDur50 based on
median values from all experiments.
Table 16. Effective Duration 50 Values from Median DecisionMaking Across all Experiments
Experiment/Severity/Cost
Experiment
1

Mild
Moderate
Severe

Headache

Symptom
Cough

Nausea

9.52
5.40
1.76

14.46
7.49
2.12

6.22
3.39
0.92

Experiment
2

Mild $10
Mild $100
Mild $1,000
Severe $10
Severe $100
Severe $1,000

6.50
19.92
145.45
1.08
4.08
16.29

10.94
37.80
240.78
1.72
5.76
31.39

3.89
13.44
111.10
0.80
2.48
26.09

Experiment
3

Mild $10
Mild $1,000
Severe $10
Severe $1,000

4.06
53.82
0.86
8.80

7.56
73.22
1.63
14.01

2.92
36.35
0.67
8.31

Note. Effective duration of symptoms experienced before likely seeking
treatment (EDur50) based on median based on the Rachlin model for all
conditions. EDur50 was derived used (1/k)1/s. EDur50 can be interpreted as the
day where treatment seeking becomes above 50% likely. Higher values of
EDur50 indicate delaying treatment seeking longer.
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Values of EDur50 were lowest (i.e., healthcare sought sooner) for severe symptoms and low
costs. By contrast, costs increased higher delays in seeking healthcare by up to 22 times (e.g.,
cough in Experiment 2). Figure 18 is a visualization of EDur50 values across experiments.
Figure 18. Plot of EDur50 Values from all Experiments

Note. Plot of effective duration of symptoms experienced before 50% of seeking healthcare
(EDur50). X-axis is the log-scaled duration of a symptom in days. White: Mild symptoms, Grey:
Moderate Symptoms, Black: Severe symptoms. Circles are headaches, diamonds are cough, and
triangles are nausea. Values to the left indicate seeking treatment sooner, whereas values to the
right indicate delaying treatment. Y-axis for Experiment 2 and 3 indicate cost of seeking
healthcare.
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Correlates of Preventive Health Behaviors
Based on the SF-12 PCS scores being positively related to delay discounting and
inversely related to seeking healthcare, exploratory analyses were conducted on the preventive
health measure (flossing) included in the demographic questions. Frequency of flossing was
compared with monetary discounting by combining the results of common monetary discounting
questions from Experiments 1 and 3. This resulted in a total of 324 participants’ data to identify
if there was a relationship between small delay and probability discounting scenarios and how
often participants floss. The purpose of assessing this relationship was to identify if there might
be an association between preventive behaviors (e.g., flossing) and measures of impulsivity or
riskiness. Figure 18 is a series of boxplots of AUCord values plotted against frequency of
flossing. There were 110 participants who identified as flossing daily, 86 flossing weekly, 38
monthly, 35 biannually, 28 annually, and 29 flossing less than annually.
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Figure 19. Boxplots of Flossing and Monetary Discounting from Experiments 1 and 3

Note. Boxplots of AUCord for small delayed gains (top left), small delayed losses (bottom left),
small probabilistic gains (top right), and small probabilistic losses (bottom right). Boxes
represent the middle 50% of the distribution, white squares represent the mean, horizontal black
lines represent the median. Whiskers are 1.5 x IQR. Frequency of flossing is Da: at least daily,
We: at least weekly, Mo: at least monthly, BiAn: at least biannually, An: at least annually, < An:
Less than annually. *: Lower significant differences from flossing daily. ~: Higher significant
difference from daily flossing. Higher values of delay AUCord indicate less impulsive decisionmaking, whereas higher values of probability AUCord indicate greater risky decision-making.
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Delay and probability discounting were significantly related to frequency of flossing, although
visually flossing had a clearer relationship to delay discounting, with those who flossed daily
having lower impulsivity scores as determined by measures of delay discounting.
Because the SF-12 PCS scores were identified as significant in most of the
MANOVAs across experiments for delay discounting and medical decision-making, PCS scores
from all 467 participants were also plotted against frequency of flossing. MCS scores were also
compared to flossing for posterity. Boxplots of SF-12 PCS and MCS scores and flossing can be
found in Figure 19. For all experiments combined, there were 160 participants who identified as
flossing daily, 126 flossing weekly, 59 monthly, 48 biannually, 36 annually, and 38 flossing less
than annually.
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Figure 20. Boxplot of SF-12 PCS Scores and Flossing from all Experiments

Note. Boxplots of SF-12 PCS (left) and SF-12 MCS (right) scores from all experiments
combined plotted against flossing frequency. Boxes represent the middle 50% of the distribution,
white squares represent the mean, horizontal black lines represent the median. Whiskers are 1.5 x
IQR. Frequency of flossing is Da: at least daily, We: at least weekly, Mo: at least monthly, BiAn:
at least biannually, An: at least annually, < An: Less than annually. *: Lower significant
difference from flossing daily. Higher values indicate higher physical health. The maximum
scores for the PCS and MCS are 20 and 27 respectively.
Much like delay discounting, PCS scores followed a similar pattern with frequency of flossing,
where those who were more likely to floss were also more likely to have better physical health.
MCS scores also followed the same pattern, even though they were not identified as significant
via MANOVAs from Experiment 1 or 3. Because of this, correlations between measures and
monetary discounting were assessed using Spearman rank correlations which are available in
Table 17.
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Table 17. Relationship Between SF-12 Summary Scores and Monetary
Discounting from Experiments 1 and 3
Variable
1. DD S +
2. DD S 3. PD S +
4. PD S 5. PCS
6. MCS

1
0.53**
0.16**
0.11
0.25**
0

2

3

4

5

6

0.53**

0.16*
0

0.11
0.18*
-0.14

0.25**
0.27**
-0.02
0.04

0
0.09
0
-0.01
0.59**

0
0.18**
0.27**
0.09

-0.14*
-0.02
0

0.04
-0.01

0.59**

Note. Spearman rank correlations between all monetary discounting and SF-12 scores
from Experiments 1 and 3. DD: Delay Discounting. PD: Probability Discounting. S:
Small Magnitude. +: Gain frame. -: Loss frame. PCS: SF-12 Physical Component
Summary Score. MCS: SF-12 Mental Component Summary Score. Dashed lines
separate monetary discounting and SF-12 scores. *: p < .05. **: p < .01. Values above
the diagonal are corrected from multiple comparisons using the Holm-Bonferroni
method.

While the relationship between flossing and MCS scores appeared to follow the same pattern as
delay discounting and PCS scores, the correlation analysis indicated that there was no
relationship between MCS and discounting. Even though scores on the MCS and PCS were
strongly correlated, only the PCS was related to delay discounting. In no case was probability
discounting related to physical or mental health measures. This post-hoc analysis adds credibility
to the positive relationship between physical health, delay discounting, and preventive health
behaviors.
General Discussion
Seeking healthcare systematically increased with severity of symptoms, and different
symptoms resulted in differential treatment seeking. Physical health, having previously
avoided/delayed healthcare due to cost, delay discounting, and flossing were all related to
seeking healthcare, where those that with better health displayed less impulsivity, but also were
more likely to engage in a preventive health behavior (i.e., flossing). The proof of concept
measure of EDur50 was also successfully employed to predict the duration a symptom at a given
severity and cost needed to be experienced prior to when one might to seek healthcare. Also, as
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the cost of accessing healthcare increased, the likelihood of seeking healthcare decreased (i.e.,
duration of symptoms experienced prior so seeking healthcare increased). This adds to the body
of evidence that cost is a meaningful factor for an individual’s determination to seek professional
healthcare.
Health Decision-Making
Health decision-making followed the pattern of hypothesized results. As the severity of a
symptom increased, the likelihood of seeking medical help also increased. An inverse
relationship was also found between cost of healthcare and treatment seeking. Treatment seeking
was generally highly correlated within a given a symptom and was also more correlated across
symptoms when the severity was the same. This same pattern also occurred for cost. Therefore,
severity, cost, and symptom were all independent regarding how they govern medical decisionmaking. Those who are more likely to seek treatment at a given cost will do so regardless of
symptom, and the same occurs for severity. However, cost overrode these factors, as indicated by
how the association within and between symptom changed as a function of cost. There was also
a commodity effect that occurred between symptoms. Cough was consistently the symptom the
had the lowest likelihood of seeking medical help, followed by headaches, and lastly nausea with
the highest likelihoods of seeking medical help across all experiments. This commodity effect is
consistent with previous research (Sawicki & Markiewicz, 2016; Weatherly & Terrell, 2014),
although the authors of those studies claimed to be assessing the magnitude effect. Given that the
health conditions in those studies compared across qualitatively different health outcomes (i.e.,
acne and cancer, acne and paralysis) rather than within health outcomes, it is fair to identify the
observed effects due to the commodity assessed (i.e., the qualitatively different outcome). This
commodity effect has also been shown for preferences between different sequences of improving

89

or deteriorating health outcomes, such as wrinkles, acne, and headaches (Chapman, 2000). In the
case of the current study, correlations for health decision-making were highest within a given
symptom, which is similar to the results of Charlton and Fantino (2008) and Holt et al. (2016) in
which commodities that were most similar had more similar discounting rates compared to
commodities that were dissimilar.
Interestingly, probability discounting for money was not related to medical decisionmaking at all. Riskiness assessed via probability discounting was not a relevant factor for
treatment seeking. However, delay discounting was generally correlated with medical decisionmaking for cough and headaches, but not nausea. Those who were more “impulsive” (i.e., lower
AUCord) were more likely to seek treatment sooner than those who were less “impulsive”. This
makes some intuitive sense, as those who are less likely to wait for a monetary outcome may also
be less likely to wait for other outcomes or information. In this case, a participant who was a
steep monetary discounter may be less willing to see if a symptom stops on its own rather than
those who are shallower discounters. That this relationship did not occur with nausea provides
further evidence that each symptom acts as a separable commodity. In this way it appears that
not all health decisions are the same or might not all be related to a unified decision-making
process (e.g., delay discounting). Another possibility is that there is an unmeasured moderating
variable not identified in the present study and further investigation is required. In the present
study, those who identified as having an underlying condition were less likely (although only
significantly so in Experiment 2) to seek healthcare for nausea relative to other conditions. It
may be that those who regularly experience a given symptom due to an underlying condition or
disease modifying treatment may be less inclined to seek healthcare for those symptoms. That is,
the individual has become habituated to nausea and it may not be evoke treatment seeking due to
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the underlying cause of that symptom being known to the individual (e.g., chemotherapy causes
nausea, if I am nauseous and on chemotherapy, I may not seek medical treatment because I know
the nausea is due to chemotherapy). Lifetime experience with a symptom may be the moderating
variable to help clarify the differential healthcare seeking between symptoms. The result that
healthcare seeking was positively related to impulsivity is in contrast with meta-analytic results
of Odum et al. (2020) that did find an inverse relationship between impulsivity and health
scenarios (i.e., lower impulsivity was correlated with lower discounting of health outcomes).
This will be discussed in more detail in the section covering methodological considerations.
Regarding associations between demographic characteristics and health decision-making,
the only significant factors that were replicated across experiments were physical health
identified via the SF-12 PCS and having previously avoided/delaying seeing a medical
professional due to cost. Increased physical health decreased the likelihood of seeking treatment,
while having previously avoiding/delaying medical help decreased the likelihood of seeking
treatment. While this only occurred for Experiments 2 and 3, the effect of physical health was
significant for cough and was non-significant for other symptoms in Experiment 1 although the
direct of the effect remained the same. Interestingly, Experiments 2 and 3 were also the two
experiments where health scenarios had an associated cost. In Experiment 1, there was a nonsignificant effect of an increase in seeking a medical professional for those that had
delayed/avoided a medical professional due to cost which was the opposite to the other two
experiments. The health scenarios in Experiment 1 did not have an associated cost, and this
could be the primary reason as to why there was a difference between these experiments. Health
questions involving cost may have evoked more relevant historical experiences during
responding. These questions may have been more ecologically valid than those without
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associated costs, as the sample was pulled from the United States. This may also be indicative of
some form of contrast between having experienced real consequences due to cost and responding
was influenced by there being a lack of cost for the health scenarios in Experiment 1. That is, not
having delayed/avoided healthcare due to cost decreased the likelihood of treatment seeking for
scenarios which involved cost, but increased treatment seeking when cost was not a factor. If this
is the case, individuals from countries with socialized healthcare may respond differently when
cost is associated with seeking treatment relative those familiar with privatized healthcare. For
example, an American may already incorporate cost into medical decision-making, while a
Canadian may not. Given that cost affects medical decision-making, those from countries who
do not have upfront costs may be more sensitive (i.e., less likely to seek treatment) to cost
increases to access healthcare. However, this needs to be explored further in future studies
comparing samples of participants outside the US.
Prediction of group healthcare seeking was also accomplished through the use of
EDur50. This was done using the most chosen model (i.e., Rachlin) and extracting the EDur50
from model estimates of median data of health decision-making. This allowed a straightforward
interpretation of when one might seek healthcare for any given symptom, as well as an easy-tointerpret metric of how cost impacts healthcare seeking. For example, increasing the cost of
accessing healthcare from $10 to $100 shifted the EDur50 ~3.4 times for mild symptoms and up
to ~3.7 times for severe symptoms.
Model Selection of Health Decisions
For health decision-making, the Rachlin model was chosen most as the most probable
model for all scenarios. The exponential model was typically the least selected probable model
on average but was close to the hyperbolic model. The GM model was the most probable model
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after the Rachlin model. The noise model was selected as the most probable for a sizeable
amount of the data paths assessed. This could be due to the number of JB criteria failures which
will be discussed in the next section, as the proportion of noise models as the most likely model
corresponded with the number of data paths that failed the JB sensitivity criteria. Overall, these
general results indicate that health decision-making scenarios like the ones in the present study
produce data similar to traditional monetary discount and that health-relation decision-making
for treatment seeking may follow similar patterns.
Monetary Discounting
The results of monetary discounting from Experiment 1 replicated previous research
assessing framing or magnitude as values of AUCord increased for loss frames and large
monetary values for delay discounting (e.g., Baker et al., 2003; Furrebøe, 2020; MerKerchar et
al., 2013). However, while the framing effect occurred for probability discounting in the
expected direction, no magnitude effect occurred. This is was somewhat unexpected, as a reverse
magnitude effect has typically been found for probability discounting of gains (e.g., Du et al.,
2002; Myerson et al., 2011; Weatherly & Terrell, 2014; Yi et al., 2006). Why this is the only
effect that was not replicated is unclear. It is possible that the size of the magnitude difference
was not large enough to evoke the effect, but at this time it is unclear for why this was the only
effect not replicated. It could also be that probability discounting is a less explored phenomena
than delay discounting, and there have been fewer opportunities for failures to replicate. For
Experiment 3, the framing effect was replicated for both probability and delay discounting.
While there was no consistent demographic variable related to monetary discounting, an
interesting note is that identifying as a smoker did slightly decrease AUCord (i.e, increased
discounting) for delay, but not probability, discounting. Delay discounting was generally
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correlated with other delay discounting scenarios, but probability discounting was not correlated
between magnitudes. Probability discounting was only correlated within gain/loss frames, but
not across gain/loss frames like delay discounting was.
Overall, monetary discounting occurred exactly as expected with the exception the of
reverse magnitude effect for probability discounting. Much like previous studies that compared
discounting models, the Rachlin model was the most selected probable model for data paths,
while the exponential model was the least selected model. The noise model generally
corresponded with the number of data paths that failed the JB sensitivity criteria. Delay and
probability discounting were not significantly correlated, indicating that delay and probability are
governed by separate processes (e.g., Green & Myerson, 2013).
Methodological Considerations
For monetary discounting, JB criteria were generally within the expected number of nonsystematic data paths based on Smith et al. (2018). It should be noted that Rung et al. (2018)
compared fixed, titrating, and VAS versions of discounting tasks and identified that the VAS had
an “unacceptable” (i.e., data paths that failed the either of the JB criteria) percentage of data
paths (47.3%). However, delay discounting assessed by the likelihood VAS in the present study
was lower for the small delay discounting gains (Experiment 1: 27.9%; Experiment 3: 32.1%).
These numbers from the present study are similar to the fixed (29.6%) and titrating tasks (26.3%)
used by Rung et al. (2018). Part of the reason for this difference may have been due to the
equivalence form of VAS that Rung et al. used, where the slider indicated the equivalent value
rather than the likelihood of choosing between two options. While there were some conditions
with an increased number of data paths that failed the sensitivity criteria for monetary
discounting, such as the larger magnitude and loss frames, there is a practical reason for this (i.e.,
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ceiling effect). Based on the median data points and AUCord for monetary discounting, most
participants exclusively were choosing the “better” option at more delays, leading it to appear
that participants were insensitive to the delay manipulations. This is most likely due to the delay
values chosen rather than a lack of sensitivity. Contrasted with health decision-making, there
were fewer data paths across all experiments that failed JB criteria for seeking medical help. The
exceptions were for severe symptoms at no cost and mild symptoms at high costs (i.e., $1,000)
which had an increased number of sensitivity failures. This is because of a ceiling/floor effect,
where if a participant was to always seek healthcare at high symptom severity, or never seek
healthcare due to high cost, it would appear as if though they were insensitive to the symptom
duration manipulations. Conceptually, and given one of the hypotheses of this study, this makes
perfect sense as cost was assumed to suppress decision-making either partially or entirely.
Bounce criteria did not seem to be affected by these manipulations. Furthermore, using
Experiment 1 as an example, JB sensitivity failures decreased for health decision-making (10.9–
22.4%). Part of this could be due to the nature of these questions being more ecologically
relevant compared to monetary discounting questions. That is, participants were probably more
likely to have experienced making a medical decision such as what was presented, rather than the
monetary decisions used in typical discounting research. Given that the total number of data
paths that failed both bounce and sensitivity criteria was generally low (3.9%, 4.7%, and 8.2%
for Experiments 1, 2, and 3 respectively), it seems that the VAS and type of questions asked
were well within tolerance and that this version of the VAS for discounting-based decisionmaking tasks was appropriate.
This study also found results that were contrary to those in previous studies that found a
positive relationship between discounting measures of monetary and health outcomes (e.g.,
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Baker et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2007; Friedel et al., 2016). The primary reason for this may be
simply the way in which questions were asked. In the case of “health boost” scenarios, this is a
rather abstract scenario that practically may never occur, and respondents to these scenarios may
value, in the abstract sense, more delayed health later. This might correspond to other preventive
behaviors that are typically associated with discounting measures (Story et al., 2014). This is
because it could be assumed that those with better physical health may already engaging in
measures to improve physical health which are antithetical to impulsive behavior, which is
supported by the relationship between flossing, delay discounting, and the SF-12 PCS scores
identified during the post-hoc analysis. However, causality of these relationships could not be
determined. In the current study, health scenarios were directly related to a participant’s
hypothetical and immediate situation. Questions were not framed as whether a participant
wanted a small good thing now or a big good thing later, but instead how likely they were to act
about in a hypothetical present situation. Assuming that delay discounting for monetary
outcomes is an assessment of impulsivity, the format of questions in the current study may
capture this “in-the-moment” decision-making whereas abstract or distant scenarios may capture
something else. Which type of question is more relevant to actual outcomes is an empirical
question to be explored in the future.
Limitations
A major limitation is that there are many aspects of the decision-making process not
captured in the current study. While immediate symptoms are a factor in decision-making to seek
professional help, numerous sources of free information regarding current symptoms are
available via the internet. This aspect of the decision-making process was not captured, and
interesting relationships with traditional monetary discounting measures may have been missed.
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For example, if a question asked, how likely are you to seek medical help after seeing that your
symptoms might be related to cancer, would probability discounting then be correlated with
decision-making? That is, there is not a clear risk associated with a potential underlying
condition versus simply the hypothetical symptom alone. Cost was also the only barrier to
healthcare that was assessed. Other factors such as distance to clinics and wait times were not
assessed but would be important to examine as they have previously been identified as
negatively correlated with healthcare utilization (e.g., Buzza et al., 2011; Virgilsen et al., 2019).
It may be that participants made this consideration, as “time is money” is a common adage.
Whether cost, distance to healthcare, and healthcare wait times are separable is area that ought to
be explored. Also missing is how people might try to mitigate symptoms prior to seeking
healthcare, such as over-the-counter remedies and naturalistic remedies.
Another limitation of the current study was this it used hypothetical tasks to assess health
decision-making without any comparisons to real health behavior. A future study could compare
results of these types of health decision-making questions to actual medical reports for when
individuals make contact with a health professional. Also, the current study consisted of
participants from MTurk. While there are limitations of using this population there are also
benefits to using them relative to typical undergraduate psychology students (Clifford et al.,
2015; Merz et al., 2020). For example, demographics were generally more varied that what are
found in undergraduate samples. Because the scenarios in this study assessed medical decisionmaking involving cost of accessing healthcare, having a population that is less likely to still be
supported financially by their parents/guardians helps improve external validity of these results.
For data analytic purposes, the demographics of the current samples were overwhelmingly
Caucasian and there were few participants who were of the lowest SES category, making it
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difficult to assess the relationship between those variables and responses to the hypothetical
scenarios. Another limitation is that only flossing was assessed as a preventive health behavior.
Determining how other behaviors such as healthy eating, regular exercise, or drug use may help
to elucidate the relationship between preventive health behaviors and treatment seeking for
current and immediate symptoms.
It’s Still the Prices, Stupid
The cost of healthcare in the US is an important factor that prevents many Americans
from accessing necessary medical help. Results of the current study indicate that associating a
cost with healthcare produces a reliable decrease in seeking medical help. More importantly,
roughly half of participants reported having avoided or delayed a real medical appointment or
procedure due to cost. Sweeping systemic change is required to produce better health outcomes
in the United States, and the results of this study help to highlight the impact that cost of
accessing healthcare has on utilization. If one of the goals of having a healthcare system is to
help keep a population healthy, identifying and decreasing barriers to utilization should help
achieve that goal. While qualitative data regarding the circumstances of delaying/avoiding were
collected, they were not reported because the experiences provided by participants were
unsurprising. Many participants reported missing routine or potential emergency health
procedures due to cost. However, one particular response shared by a participant perfectly
encapsulates the issues inherent in the American medical system and the urgency of why it needs
to be fixed:
I am doing this right now. I have a subclavian aneurysm that’s grown to the size of a golf
ball. It has to be surgically removed and if it ruptures before that, I’ll die. It gets a little
bigger everyday, but I can’t afford the copays, so guess I’ll die?
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Appendix A. Slider Comprehension
[] = slider, | = tick marks
Slider example:
Choice 1
50%
Choice 2
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
Percentage comprehension task:
Prior to beginning the study, you will be required to complete 3 slider/percentage training
questions, followed by a 4-question percentage comprehension test. If you do not pass the
percentage comprehension test, you will be excluded from the study and ineligible for
compensation. Please pay careful attention to the following examples and questions. This section
should take less than 3 minutes. If you exit out of this survey, you will not be able to reopen it.
In the following questions you will be asked a series of questions involving ratios and the
corresponding percentages associated with them. You will be using a slider bar to identify your
answer. Understanding percentages is key to this study, as most questions will be in this format.
Every answer will require to move or click the slider, even if it is already at the value you wish
to choose. Below are some examples of how choosing between two options work in the context
of this survey.
Here are some examples of making choices using the slider bar:
Choosing A 100% of the time, B 0% of the time
A
50%
B
[]---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
Choosing A 75% of the time, B 25% of the time
A
50%
B
|---------------[]---------------|---------------|---------------|
Choosing A 50% of the time, B 50% of the time
A
50%
B
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
Choosing A 25% of the time, B 75% of the time
A
50%
B
|---------------|---------------|---------------[]---------------|
Choosing A 0% of the time, B 100% of the time
A
50%
B
|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------[]
You will now be tested on the above. Understanding the slider is necessary to continue onto the
study. If you do not get all the four following questions correct you will be considered ineligible
and removed from the study. You will only have one chance to answer these correctly, so please
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pay attention to the questions carefully. You will not get compensated if you are removed from
the study in this way.
Please move the sliders to the correct values in the following example questions
If you 100% would choose A over B, move the slider to the correct spot
A
50%
B
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
(correct answer)
A
50%
B
[]---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
If you 100% would choose B over A, move the slider to the correct spot
A
50%
B
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
(correct answer)
A
50%
B
|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------[]
If you would choose A 50% of the time and B 50% of the time, move the slider to the correct
spot
A
50%
B
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
(correct answer)
A
50%
B
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
If you would choose A 25% of the time and B 75% of the time, move the slider to the correct
spot
A
50%
B
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
(correct answer)
A
50%
B
|---------------|---------------|---------------[]---------------|
If you would choose A 75% of the time and B 25% of the time, move the slider to the correct
spot
A
50%
B
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
(correct answer)
A
50%
B
|---------------[]---------------|---------------|---------------|
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Appendix B. Screener Possibilities
If 100% on comprehension:
You have successfully completed the screener.
(Followed by either Health Break or Monetary Discounting Break)
If less than 100% on comprehension:
We are sorry, you did not complete the following task correctly. We would like to thank you for
your time and interest in the study. You will now receive a code to be compensated for your
time.
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Appendix C. Preambles Prior to Monetary and Health Decision-Making
Monetary Discounting Break
The following questions will consist of hypothetical choices between two monetary values that
will vary in their likelihood or delay to getting the money. Answer these questions to the best of
your ability and as if the situation were real. Note that there is no wrong way to answer these
questions. You also have more freedom with the sliders for your choices.
Health Break
The following questions will ask you to imagine having experienced a particular symptom at a
certain severity for some period of time. Assume that these symptoms are NOT related to
COVID-19. Answer the following questions as if the situation were real. Note that there is no
wrong way to answer these questions.
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Appendix D. Symptom Concerns
With regard to nausea, what is your overall concern about experiencing…
Mild Nausea
Slider from 0 – 6, 0 being not at all concerned, 6 being very concerned
Moderate Nausea
Slider from 0 – 6, 0 being not at all concerned, 6 being very concerned
Severe Nausea
Slider from 0 – 6, 0 being not at all concerned, 6 being very concerned
With regard to coughing, what is your overall concern about experiencing…
Mild Coughing
Slider from 0 – 6, 0 being not at all concerned, 6 being very concerned
Moderate Coughing
Slider from 0 – 6, 0 being not at all concerned, 6 being very concerned
Severe Coughing
Slider from 0 – 6, 0 being not at all concerned, 6 being very concerned
With regard to headaches, what is your overall concern about experiencing…
Mild Headaches
Slider from 0 – 6, 0 being not at all concerned, 6 being very concerned
Moderate Headaches
Slider from 0 – 6, 0 being not at all concerned, 6 being very concerned
Severe Headaches
Slider from 0 – 6, 0 being not at all concerned, 6 being very concerned
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Appendix E. Demographic Questions
Demographics survey:
Age: _______
Occupation: _______
Gender Identity: _______
Ethnic Identity (select all that apply):
• Asian
• Black/African
• Caucasian
• Hispanic/Latin
• Native American
• Pacific Islander
• Specify: ______
• Prefer not to answer
Highest level of education:
• Some high school
• High school diploma or equivalent
• Some university
• Associate’s degree
• Bachelor’s degree
• Some graduate school
• Master’s degree
• Doctoral degree
Annual Income: ________
Do you have employment other than MTurk?
• If yes,
o What is your other employment?
• If no,
o Did you lose your job due to COVID-19?
How often do you floss?
• At least once a day
• At least once a week
• At least once a month
• At least one in six months
• At least once a year
• Less than once a year
Health Insurance Status:
• Insured
• Not insured (If Insured then ask coverage):
• If Medicaid/medicare move on to next question
Percent covered by insurance: _______
Co-pay amount: ________
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•

•

Uninsured
• If uninsured is yes,
• Did you lose health insurance due to COVID-19 related reasons (e.g., job loss, budget
cuts, inability to pay for health insurance
• If yes is selected,
• Please describe the reason you lost your health insurance due to COVID-19
Family’s/spouse’s insurance

119

Appendix F. SF-12 Survey
SF-12 Health Survey:
Ware, J. E., Jr., Kosinski, M., & Keller, S. D. (1996). A 12-item short-form health survey:
Construction of scales and preliminary tests of reliability and validity. Medical Care, 34,
220–233.
1. In general, would you say your health is:
a. Excellent
b. Very good
c. Good
d. Fair
e. Poor
2. The following items are about activities you might do during a typical day, does your
health now limit you in these activities? If so, how much? (Options of “Yes, limited a
lot”, “Yes, limited a little”, and “No, not limited at all”
a. Moderate activities, such as moving a table, pushing a vacuum cleaner, bowling,
or playing golf
b. Climbing several flights of stairs
3. During the past 4 weeks, have you had any of the following problems with your work or
other regular daily activities as a result of your physical health? (yes/no)
a. Accomplished less than you would like
b. Were limited in the kind of work or other activities
4. During the past 4 weeks, have you had any of the following problems with your work or
other regular daily activities as a result of any emotional problems (such as feeling
depressed or anxious)? (yes/no)
a. Accomplished less than you would like
b. Didn’t do work or other activities as carefully as usual
5. During the past 4 weeks, how much did pain interfere with your normal work (including
both work outside the home and housework)?
a. Not at all
b. A little bit
c. Moderately
d. Quite a bit
e. Extremely
6. These questions are about how you feel and how things have ben with you during the past
4 weeks. For each question, please give the answer that comes closest to the way you
have been feeling. How much time in the past 4 weeks (all the time, most of the time, a
good bit of the time, some of the time, a little bit of the time, none of the time).
a. Have you felt calm and peaceful?
b. Did you have a lot of energy?
c. Have you felt downhearted and blue?
7. During the past 4 weeks, how much of the time has your physical health or emotional
problems interfered with your social activities (like visiting with friends, relatives, etc.)?
a. All of the time
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b.
c.
d.
e.

Most of the time
Some of the time
A little of the time
None of the time
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Appendix G. Fagerström Test for Nicotine Dependence
Do you smoke cigarettes?
• If yes, continue to Fagerström Test for Nicotine Dependence, else skip
Heatherton, T. T., Kozlowski, L. T., Frecker, R. C., & Fagerström, K. (1991). The Fagerström
Test for Nicotine Dependence: A revision of the Fagerström Tolerance Questionnaire. British
Journal of Addiction, 86¸ 1119 – 1127.
1. How soon after you wake up do you smoke your first cigarette?
a. Within 5 minutes
b. 6 – 30 minutes
c. 31 – 60 minutes
d. After 60 minutes
2. Do you find it difficult to refrain from smoking in places where it is forbidden?
a. Yes/no
3. Which cigarette would you hate most to give up?
a. The first one in the morning
b. All others
4. How many cigarettes a day do you smoke?
a. 10 or less
b. 11-120
c. 21-30
d. 31 or more
5. Do you smoke more frequently during the first hours after waking than during the rest of
the day?
a. Yes/no
6. Do you smoke if you are so ill that you are in bed most of the day?
a. Yes/no
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Appendix H. Trust in Medical Profession
Dugan, E., Trachtenberg, F., & Hall, M. A. (2005). Development of abbreviated measures to
asses patient trust in a physician, a health insurer, and the medical profession. BMC Health
Services Research, 5, 64.
1. Sometimes doctors care more about what is convenient for them than about their patient’s
medical needs. (scoring is inverted for this question)
a. Strongly Disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly Agree
2. Doctors are extremely thorough and helpful.
a. Strongly Disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly Agree
3. You completely trust doctor’s decisions about which medical treatments are best.
a. Strongly Disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly Agree
4. A doctor would never mislead you about anything.
a. Strongly Disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly Agree
5. All in all, you trust doctors completely.
a. Strongly Disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly Agree
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Appendix I. General Medical Questions
a. Have you ever avoided going to a doctor for an illness due to cost? (Yes/no)
b. Have you ever delayed going to a doctor for an illness due to cost? (Yes/no)
c. If yes to any of the above questions: Please describe in more detail your experience of
delaying/refusing/avoiding some medical procedure/visit due to cost. (Open-ended
comment)
Do you have an underlying health condition? (E.g., immunocompromised, blood disorder,
metabolic disorder, diabetes, obesity)
a. Yes/no
b. If yes, what is the underlying condition?
Do you have a family member underlying health condition? (E.g., immunocompromised, blood
disorder, metabolic disorder, diabetes, obesity)
c. Yes/no
d. If yes, what is the underlying condition?
Do you have any close friends with underlying health condition? (E.g., immunocompromised,
blood disorder, metabolic disorder, diabetes, obesity, asthma)
e. Yes/no
f. If yes, what is the underlying condition?
Please comment on your decision-making during the previous tasks.
Open-ended question.
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Appendix J. Example Questions
Probability and Delay Values Used
Monetary Delay Values: 1 day, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years
Monetary Probability values: 99%, 80%, 50%, 20%, 1%
Monetary Magnitudes: $500/$1000, $5000/$10000
Health Delay Values: 6 hours, 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 6 months
Symptoms: Headache, nausea, cough
Severities: Mild, moderate, severe.
Health Costs: $10, $100, $1000
Example Monetary-Discounting Questions
Gain Frame, Delay and Probability, Small Magnitude.
“What is the likelihood that you would select gaining $1,000 in 6 months over a gaining $500
immediately?”
Gain $500
Gain 1,000$ in
immediately
6 months
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
“What is the likelihood that you would select a 20% chance of gaining $1,000 over a 100%
chance of gaining $500?”
100% chance
20% chance of
of gaining
gaining 1,000$
$500
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
Loss Frame, Delay and Probability, Small Magnitude.
“What is the likelihood that you would select losing $10,000 in 6 months over a losing $5,000
immediately?”
Lose $5,000
Lose $10,000
immediately
in 6 months
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
“What is the likelihood that you would select a 20% chance of losing $10,000 over a 100%
chance of gaining $5,000?”
100% chance
20% chance of
of losing
losing $10,000
$5,000
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
Example Health-Discounting Questions
“You have been experiencing mild headaches for the past week. How likely are you to contact or
see a healthcare professional for your symptoms?”
0% chance of
Mild
100% chance of
contacting/seeing headaches
contacting/seeing
for 1 week
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healthcare
healthcare
professional
professional
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
“You have been experiencing severe nausea for the past 6 hours. How likely are you to contact
or see a healthcare professional for your symptoms?”
0% chance of
Severe
100% chance of
contacting/seeing nausea for 6 contacting/seeing
healthcare
hours
healthcare
professional
professional
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
Example Health and Monetary Discounting Questions
“You have been experiencing mild headaches for the past week. It will cost you $100 to contact
or see a healthcare professional. How likely are you to contact or see a healthcare professional
for your symptoms?”
0% chance of
Mild
100% chance of
contacting/seeing headaches
contacting/seeing
healthcare
for 1 week
healthcare
professional at
professional at
$100
$100
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
“You have been experiencing severe nausea for the past 6 hours. It will cost you $1000 to
contact or see a healthcare professional. How likely are you to contact or see a healthcare
professional for your symptoms?”
0% chance of
Severe
100% chance of
contacting/seeing nausea for 6 contacting/seeing
healthcare
hours
healthcare
professional at
professional at
$1000
$1000
|---------------|---------------[]---------------|---------------|
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Appendix K. IRB Approval
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Appendix L. IRB Approved Changes
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